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ABSTRACT 
 
Chapter 1 
While there has been a tremendous amount of literature on how Unemployment Insurance (UI) 
affects unemployed workers’ job search behavior, there has been no previous study on how the 
health insurance premium subsidy affects this behavior. To fill the gap in previous studies, this 
paper analyzes the impact of the substantial federal health insurance premium subsidy on 
unemployment duration, using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). 
To begin this study, I detail the history of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(COBRA) of 1985 that was established to help keep unemployed workers insured. Furthermore, 
in order to help unemployed individuals reduce the cost of getting insurance, the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 provided a 65% health insurance premium 
subsidy for workers who lost their jobs involuntarily and elected to take up COBRA coverage. 
The extended unemployment duration resulting from this premium subsidy is equivalent to the 
effect of increasing Unemployment Insurance benefits by 56 percent which is equal to $168 per 
week. In order to identify the subsidy effect on the duration of unemployment, this paper 
compares the unemployment duration of two different unemployed cohorts who lost their jobs 
just before and after the end of subsidy eligibility. This study sheds light on the unemployed 
workers’ job search behaviors during the Great Recession and finds that the COBRA premium 
subsidy causes unemployed workers to significantly increase their unemployment duration by 
2.11 months. The empirical results are consistent with the predictions of job search theory.  
Therefore, these estimates imply that the COBRA premium subsidy is having an important 
impact on the unemployed workers’ job transition behavior. 
 
  
Chapter 2 
This paper analyzes the impact of the Employer Sponsored Insurance (ESI) expansion, part of 
the 2006 Massachusetts health reform, on Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) 
participation decisions. I exploit the variation across SSDI beneficiaries among married couples 
to identify the causal effect of the reform. I find that for spouses without ESI, the positive effect 
of the ESI expansion on SSDI participation is 0.98 percentage points stronger than it is for 
spouses with ESI. These estimates imply that spouses without ESI increases SSDI beneficiaries 
by 0.0429% (i.e., the 10.73% of total SSDI beneficiaries increase in Massachusetts after the 
reform) and is associated with higher SSDI beneficiaries. Moreover, my estimates imply an 
elasticity of spouses without ESI with respect to SSDI beneficiaries of 0.0913. The calculations 
suggest that the health reform was more expensive than it might first appear because of an 
increase in SSDI expenditure. 
 
Chapter 3 
This paper analyzes the impact of the Medicaid expansion, part of the 2006 Massachusetts health 
reform, on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation decisions. I exploit the variation 
across SSI-disabled applicants to identify the causal effect of the reform on the SSI claim rate. 
My estimates imply that the reform reduces SSI-disabled claims by 0.098% (i.e., the 11.66% of 
total claims in 2008 in Massachusetts) and is associated with a lower initial SSI claim. These 
estimates also imply Medicaid-disabled expenditure can save around 1% by attending to small 
inefficiencies in the current program. However, the calculations suggest that the health reform 
was not as expensive as it might first appear because of reductions in SSI expenditure. 
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Chapter 1.The Impact of the COBRA Premium Subsidy on the Duration of Unemployment: 
Evidence from the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the U.S., most group health insurance is closely tied to employment. As a result, those who are 
separated from employment generally go uninsured because insurance is both more expensive 
and less generous in individual insurance markets. This low rate of insurance coverage among 
the unemployed has brought considerable public policy debate over interventions in insurance 
markets to increase health insurance access for the non-employed (Gruber and Madrian, 1997).   
To help keep unemployed workers insured, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985 requires most employers to offer coverage to former 
employees for up to 18 months after job termination. However, the COBRA insurance usage rate 
has been modest because the COBRA costs employees 102 percent of their pre-termination 
health insurance premium, i.e., the entire premium plus up to 2 percent more for administrative 
expenses (so employers don’t need to share the premium costs). Consequently, many are unable 
to afford to pay the full premium after their job loss (Lambrew, 2001). 
The extent of job loss during the Great Recession was severe and unforeseen; according 
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the unemployment rate climbed up to 9-10 percent between 
2009 and 2011. In order to help unemployed individuals reduce the cost of getting insurance, the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of February 2009 gave a 65 percent health 
insurance premium subsidy to workers who lost their jobs involuntarily between September 2008 
and May 2010, to enable them to continue coverage for up to 15 months through their former 
employers’ plans. The subsidy substantially reduced the cost of health insurance after job loss; 
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on average, the subsidy amount is about $816 per month for family coverage and $294 per 
month for single coverage.1  
However, some studies have found that any intervention by the government to protect the 
unemployed may distort the employment behavior of unemployed workers (Gruber and Madrian, 
1997). Employees do pay for the cost of health insurance, either explicitly through employee 
premiums or implicitly through lower wages when they are working. After individuals become 
unemployed they start to pay the full cost of health insurance premiums. The ARRA health 
insurance premium subsidy was designed to subsidize the 65 percent of the full cost of health 
insurance for the unemployed. This large subsidy could have a direct and immediate impact on 
unemployed workers by decreasing their job search efforts, and hence contributing to longer 
unemployment durations.  
While there has been a considerable amount of literature on how Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) affects the unemployed workers’ job search behavior, to the best of my 
knowledge, there has been no previous study on how the health insurance premium subsidy 
affects unemployed workers’ job search behavior. This study is among the first to estimate the 
impact of the COBRA premium subsidy on the duration of unemployment. I estimate the 
relationship between the COBRA premium subsidy and unemployment duration by analyzing 
data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the nationally representative 
panel study of households. 
This paper focuses on one hypothesis; based on job search theory, the substantial health 
insurance premium subsidy will cause the COBRA premium subsidy-eligible unemployed 
individuals to have longer unemployed spells than the COBRA premium subsidy-ineligible 
                                                 
1 These numbers are based on average monthly premiums for employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) in 2011 $1256 for family 
coverage and $452 for single coverage (Kaiser/HRET, 2012). 
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unemployed individuals. The job search theory states that reducing the cost of being unemployed 
will increase an individual’s expected duration of unemployment (Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976). 
I hypothesize that a premium subsidy would encourage unemployed workers to decrease their 
job search efforts, thereby contributing to an extension of the duration of their unemployment.  
I identify the subsidy effect by the following procedures. First, I re-organize the data into 
one observation per individual and construct the unemployed cohort by identifying the workers 
who lost their jobs involuntarily during a particular month. Next, I trace each unemployed 
individual until he or she obtains his/her first paid job and calculate the duration of 
unemployment (i.e., how many months they spend on their job search).2 Finally, I document the 
effect of the premium subsidy on the labor market outcome by comparing the unemployment 
duration of two different unemployed cohorts who lost their jobs involuntarily just before and 
after the end of subsidy eligibility. 
After analyzing the data, I find that the COBRA premium subsidy-eligible unemployed 
workers are predicted to significantly increase their unemployment duration by 2.11 months, 
conditional on underlying factors influencing their individual preferences for insurance and 
unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. The extended unemployment duration resulting from the 
premium subsidy is equivalent to the effect of increasing UI benefits by 56 percent which is 
equal to $168 per week. This is contrary to Gruber and Madrian (1997), who found that the 
COBRA has little effect on the duration of unemployment. Two reasons may potentially explain 
why my study results in different findings. First, the period covered by Gruber and Madrian’s 
study was almost twenty years ago (1983-1989), before the COBRA premium subsidy was 
                                                 
2 If the unemployed only find a unpaid job through the whole panel, the duration will be recorded at the point when they find a 
job. 
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available. Second, their study limited the focus to prime-aged (25-54 years old) males, while this 
paper studies the whole sample population.3  
The rest of this paper is laid out in six sections. After giving the background on the 
ARRA COBRA subsidy in section 2, section 3 discusses the theoretical prediction between the 
COBRA premium subsidy and the unemployment duration. The data and empirical strategy are 
summarized in section 4. Section 5 presents the results while section 6 discusses the implications 
in terms of UI. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
The COBRA of 1985 offers former employees (and their qualified dependents), who terminate 
employment for reasons other than gross misconduct, the opportunity to purchase Employer-
Sponsored Insurance from their former employers after their employment ends, at a premium not 
exceeding 102 percent (i.e., entire premium and 2 percent for administrative costs) of the group 
rate. The COBRA requires employers with 20 or more employees to make health insurance 
coverage available for up to 18 months after job termination. Many states have extended these 
provisions to small businesses of 2-19 employees (NCSL, 2009).4 Employers are required to 
provide a notice of eligibility for a health plan to ex-workers within 30 days, and the insurance 
plans must send an election notice within 90 days after the job termination. A former employee 
has 60 days to elect this coverage from the date the notice was sent (Internal Revenue Service 
                                                 
3 In SIPP, the labor force status recorded the people who are aged 15 or more. 
4 During the subsidy period, two states expanded COBRA coverage. First, Pennsylvania Act 2 of 2009 was signed into law to 
give employees of small businesses who receive health insurance from their employers the right to purchase continuation health 
insurance after they leave employment. Second, Connecticut allowed COBRA coverage up to 30 months on May 2010 
(Connecticut Public Act 10-13). This study tests results with and without Pennsylvania and Connecticut and, in both cases, the 
results are robust. 
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(IRS), 2009). For employees, their employers usually cover a portion of the premium.5 The 
premium under the COBRA is around four times higher for family coverage and six times higher 
for single individuals compared with when they were employed. 
The ARRA, passed on February 17, 2009, subsidized 65 percent of the COBRA premium 
starting with the very next period of coverage, typically March 1st, for individuals who lost their 
jobs involuntarily between September 1, 2008 and May 31, 2010 and were ineligible for other 
group health coverage (e.g., a spouse's plan or new employer’s plan) or Medicare (IRS, 2009). 
The premium subsidy can be drawn up to 15 months. Those who were laid off on or after 
September 1, 2008 but before February 17, 2009 became eligible for the subsidy retroactively 
and were given a second chance to elect the COBRA coverage. Employers covered by federal or 
state COBRA laws were mandated by the ARRA to send notices within thirty days of job 
termination to ex-workers who had previously enrolled in their employers’ group health 
insurance plan. The employees (and their qualified dependents) were asked to decide whether to 
take up the subsidized coverage within sixty days. After eligible unemployed workers who take 
up the subsidy pay 35 percent of premiums, their former employers will pay 65 percent of 
premiums and receive reimbursement via federal tax credits. If eligible unemployed workers 
don’t report that they or their families are qualified for other group health coverage or Medicare 
and receive the subsidy, they will need to pay penalties of up to 100 percent of the subsidy 
received. 
 
3. Theoretical Prediction 
                                                 
5 On average, 82 percent of the premium costs is paid by the employer for single coverage and 72 percent for family coverage 
(Kaiser/HRET, 2012). 
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Mortensen (1977) suggests that the following analysis is applicable when comparing any two 
groups, one receiving benefits (COBRA premium subsidy), the other not, provided that members 
of both groups qualify for benefits (COBRA) during an employer-initiated unemployment spell. 
Specifically, because the potential benefit period per unemployment spell is limited and because 
qualification is limited to workers who become unemployed due to their employers, unemployed 
workers receiving no extra benefit have an incentive to become employed more rapidly than 
would otherwise be the case. 
The ARRA COBRA premium subsidy reduces substantial medical costs for the COBRA 
eligible individuals and hence, may contribute to longer unemployment duration compared to 
their counterparts. I also test this hypothesis on subsidy-eligible groups of people who are: older 
(35 or above); educated (some college or above); older and educated; married (spouse present or 
absent); and the full sample. Next, before I discuss these groups, it is useful to consider two types 
of costs related to insurance options: monetary cost (covered by 65 percent premium subsidy) 
and information cost (such as the time it takes to learn that the COBRA premium subsidy is 
available). In terms of monetary cost, this subsidy will help unemployed individuals with high 
medical costs (i.e., higher insurance premium) to reduce their unemployed costs substantially. 
Unemployed workers with higher education may have smaller information costs because they 
may be more aware of the ARRA subsidy, as well as be able to better comprehend the related 
policies. Apart from smaller information costs, this subsidy can further reduce unemployed costs 
for the educated. Consequently, the older educated may have much lower unemployed costs due 
to smaller information and monetary costs. Lastly, married unemployed individuals may have a 
longer unemployment spell because the higher the insurance premium costs for their family 
members, the higher amount of premium subsidy they will receive.  
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4. Data and empirical strategy 
4.1 Data 
The impact of the COBRA premium subsidy on the duration of unemployment is examined 
using data from the 2008 panel of the SIPP, (a longitudinal, stratified, random sample of families 
in the United States). The SIPP full panel that began in 2008 (the 2008–2012 SIPP) enrolled 
people from May 2008 through August 2008 and followed them for 52 months, which enables 
comparisons of the duration of unemployment during and beyond the implementation of the 
subsidy. The survey uses a 4-month recall period to conduct interviews every 4 months and asks 
respondents about their employment status and insurance coverage, among other things, in each 
of the previous 4 months. With monthly information on health insurance status and employment 
status, the impact of the premium subsidy could be more accurately measured compared to the 
Current Population Study, which only contains yearly information. 
The longitudinal structure, along with the rich demographic and socioeconomic 
information in SIPP, allows for the tracking of each unemployed individual for a period of four 
to five years while controlling for underlying factors influencing individual preference for 
insurance. To identify the unemployed individuals that are eligible for the COBRA coverage, 
and the subsidy respectively, the person-month format is collapsed into person-record format and 
the unemployed cohorts are constructed by identifying when they began their unemployment 
spell. Therefore, the populations that are eligible for the COBRA coverage, and hence the 
subsidy, could be identified.  
Collapsing the data into 126,275 individuals makes the analysis much more manageable 
than working with the underlying 3.91 million observations. Moreover, it allows researchers to 
easily understand and control for the individual characteristics involved in choosing the COBRA 
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subsidy. To identify those who potentially elected the COBRA coverage, the monthly health 
insurance status and employment status are used as indicators of whether individuals obtain 
health insurance through their former employers when they become unemployed. Further, those 
who lost their jobs involuntarily during the implementation of the subsidy could be identified and 
thus, they are potentially eligible for the COBRA premium subsidy.  
Ryscavage (1988) uses two definitions of unemployment: a limited definition and a 
comprehensive definition.6 The limited definition is confined to only two scenarios. The first 
identifies individuals as being unemployed (looking for work or on layoff) the entire month. The 
second identifies individuals as being unemployed for part of the month and not in the labor 
force for the rest of the month. The comprehensive definition of unemployment includes two 
more scenarios. The other two scenarios reflect individuals who, in addition to being 
unemployed at the same time during the month, also had a job, or had a job as well as some time 
outside the labor force. 
This paper uses Ryscavage’s comprehensive definition of unemployment to identify 
unemployed individuals, instead of the limited definition of unemployment, because it provides 
more stable results for a large sample. After I reconstruct the data and identify unemployment 
cohorts for each month separately, from March 2010 to August 2010, the monthly cohorts could 
be further accumulated into an aggregate sample to obtain better and more precise estimates. In 
order to check whether the results are robust to the time trend, this aggregate sample is divided 
into three different cohorts based on the end of subsidy eligibility, May 31st, 2010. The three 
different cohorts are: May/June = unemployment begins in May 2010-June 2010; April-
                                                 
6 In SIPP, the comprehensive definition of unemployment are defined as follows: (1) With job entire month, missed 1 or more 
weeks because of a layoff; (2) With job part of month, some time spent on layoff or looking for work; (3) No job in month, spent 
entire month on layoff or looking for work; (4) No job in month, spent part of month on layoff or looking for work. The limited 
definition of unemployment only consists of persons with (3) and (4). 
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May/June-July = unemployment begins in April 2010-July 2010; and Mar.-May/June-Aug. = 
unemployment begins in March 2010-August 2010. Lastly, each unemployed individual is traced 
until he or she obtained his or her first paid job so that I am able to calculate the duration of 
unemployment.  
 
4.2 Empirical strategy 
In order to distinguish between the subsidy-eligible and the subsidy-ineligible unemployed 
individuals, this study uses the end of subsidy eligibility, May 31st, 2010, as the cut-off date to 
estimate the effect of the subsidy. After the ARRA passed in February 2009, the unemployed 
individuals have an available health insurance premium subsidy if they are separated from their 
jobs before/to the end of subsidy eligibility. They can reduce their health insurance premiums 
substantially by taking this subsidy immediately after job termination. Therefore, I compare the 
unemployment duration of two different unemployed cohorts who lost their jobs just before and 
after the end of subsidy eligibility to identify the effect of the premium subsidy on the labor 
market outcome. 
The subsidy effect can’t be estimated by using the beginning of subsidy eligibility (i.e., 
September 2008) for two reasons. First, the health insurance premium subsidy is not available for 
workers who become unemployed during September 2008; they can’t foresee the presence of the 
premium subsidy, which is available 6 months after job loss. Some unemployed workers may 
make up their mind on a job search plan within a few months after they lost their jobs. Others 
may also begin looking for jobs right away because of financial burdens (e.g., living expenses, 
health insurance premiums and so on). Second, unemployed individuals usually find a job within 
six months after job termination. The six-month gap between September 2008 and February 
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2009 prevents eligible unemployed individuals from utilizing the subsidy if they become re-
employed with health insurance benefits during this period. 
This study compares the duration of unemployment during, and beyond, the subsidy-
eligible period for a population that is eligible for the COBRA premium subsidy, controlling for 
a number of characteristics of individuals that could affect preferences for insurance. If the 
relationship parameter β is estimated by regressing the observed Duration on Subsidy, the 
resulting ordinary least squares regression estimator is inconsistent. It will yield a downward 
biased estimate of the slope coefficient and an upward biased estimate of the intercept. Takeshi 
Amemiya (1973) has proven that the maximum likelihood estimator suggested by Tobin for this 
model is consistent.  
The basic Tobit models are of the forms: 
 
DURATION* = α + β*SUBSIDY + δ*X + u, u ~ i.i.d. N (0, σ2) (1) 
 LOG (DURATION)* = α + β*SUBSIDY + δ*X + u, u ~ i.i.d. N (0, σ2)   (2) 
 
                          Duration* if Duration* < Durationul     
Duration =  
              Durationul if Duration* ≥ Durationul 
where Durationul is the upper limit of duration. The model supposes that there is a latent (i.e., 
unobservable) variable Duration*. This variable linearly depends on SUBSIDY via a parameter 
(vector) β which determines the relationship between the independent variable (or 
vector) SUBSIDY and the latent variable Duration* (just as in a linear model). In addition, there 
is a normally distributed error term u to capture random influences on this relationship. The 
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observable variable Duration is defined to be equal to the latent variable whenever the latent 
variable is above or equal to the upper limit of duration, and less than the upper limit of duration 
otherwise. The β coefficient is interpreted as the combination of: one, the change in Duration of 
those above the limit, weighted by the probability of being above the limit; and two, the change 
in the probability of being above the limit, weighted by the expected value of Duration if above.  
Using LOG (DURATION) as the dependent variable in a model, the coefficient on a 
dummy variable, when multiplied by 100, is interpreted as the percentage difference in 
DURATION, holding all other factors fixed. The vector of control variables, X, represents 
individuals’ demographic and socioeconomic characteristics including age, race, marital status, 
education level, sex, and number of own children less than 18 years old in the family.  
The source of variation in SUBSIDY is clear when we collapse the underlying micro-data 
from 3.91 million observations to 126,275 individuals: the preference for insurance arises from 
variations across age, race, marital status, education level, sex, and number of own children less 
than 18 years old in the family. Obviously each of these dimensions is correlated with 
preferences for insurance, so the regression for every category could be controlled. Therefore, in 
this specification, identification comes from the variation in the premium subsidy within these 
groups. That is, this approach uses the fact that the premium subsidy changes for the eligible 
versus the non-eligible unemployed workers over time.  
This is a powerful empirical framework. It allows for differences in individual choice of 
insurance between the eligible and the non-eligible unemployed workers, and controls for any 
observable factors which might affect the relative demand for insurance by the eligible and the 
in-eligible unemployed workers over time. Subsidizing non-employment through the COBRA 
does raise the likelihood that prime-age males leave their jobs (Gruber and Madrian, 1997). 
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However, given this era of historically severe recession, very high layoffs, and long lags in 
finding new jobs, the probability of separating from the COBRA or the COBRA premium 
subsidy should be minimal.   
Another concern is that the COBRA itself may have effects on the duration of 
unemployment. In theory, we could employ the hazard model to investigate the effect of the 
COBRA on the unemployment duration directly (Meyer, 1990). In practice, however, the 
Meyer’s model would make it difficult to interpret the findings, since the sample of workers 
becoming unemployed is itself affected by the availability of the COBRA or even affected by the 
COBRA premium subsidy. Of course, there are potential concerns that other changes that are 
correlated with the change in the premium subsidy could bias these estimates. For instance, if 
those becoming unemployed have disproportionately short spells because of the COBRA or the 
COBRA premium subsidy, this would bias downward the estimated effect of the COBRA 
premium subsidy on the duration of unemployment. 
Therefore, a more aggregate approach is taken to look at the effect of the COBRA 
premium subsidy on the duration of unemployment during a six-month period.7 That is, a sample 
of unemployed workers is taken from March 2010 to August 2010. After accumulating more 
monthly cohorts, the estimates will be more reliable and precise and the results are consistent 
across different cohorts.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics and figures 
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics for two different unemployed cohorts. One is for the 
subsidy-eligible unemployed individuals, and the other is for the subsidy-ineligible unemployed 
                                                 
7 This parallels the approach of Levine (1993) and Gruber and Madrian (1997) 
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workers. The relatively low fraction of married and relatively high fraction of non-white female 
workers is indicative of the subsidy-eligible cohorts' characteristics. Across all unemployed 
cohorts, the mean duration is higher for the subsidy-eligible unemployed workers compared to 
the subsidy-ineligible unemployed individuals. In addition to the higher average duration for the 
subsidy-eligible unemployed workers, the COBRA eligible has the largest average duration 
among all other groups. In terms of mean age and average level of education, there is not much 
difference between the subsidy-eligible and the subsidy-ineligible unemployed workers. The 
mean age is close to 40 years old while the average level of education is some college or above.  
In order to see how these unemployed workers respond to the subsidy in terms of 
unemployed spells, figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the spell distributions for the two different 
unemployed cohorts, the subsidy-eligible and subsidy-ineligible unemployed individuals. From 
the figures, the shape of these two graphs are similar but the density of spell length for longer 
unemployed spells are larger for subsidy-eligible group compared to the subsidy-ineligible group.   
 
5.2 Basic regression results 
Estimates obtained from Tobit regression support the hypothesis that an intensive health 
insurance premium subsidy increased the spell duration for the subsidy-eligible unemployed, 
even controlling for the underlying individual choice of insurance. Furthermore, estimates based 
upon the other five groups of unemployed workers who are eligible for the subsidy indicates 
significant, but smaller impacts of the premium subsidy on the duration of unemployment. Table 
1.2 presents the results for all three cohorts from estimating Eq. (1) by controlling the covariates. 
In this regression, the coefficient on SUBSIDY, β (subsidy effect), is positive and statistically 
significant almost across all three cohorts, and it measures the average difference in the duration 
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of unemployment between the subsidy-eligible and the subsidy-ineligible unemployed workers, 
given the same levels of age, race, marital status, education level, sex, and number of own 
children less than 18 years old in the family.  
Table 1.2 has six panels; in all six cases comparisons are made relative to the subsidy-
ineligible unemployed workers conditional on underlying factors influencing individual 
preference for insurance. The results in panel A show that the subsidy had a significant impact 
on the COBRA subsidy-eligible unemployed workers, which are predicted to increase by 
between 2.09 months and 2.62 months. The COBRA subsidy-eligible unemployed workers have 
a much larger behavioral response to the premium subsidy than the other groups because the 
COBRA eligible group is the main beneficiary of the ARRA COBRA subsidy. These results are 
consistent with the predictions of job search theory.  
Evidence in panels B to E reflects that the subsidy had a significant predicted impact on 
respective targeted subsidy-eligible groups. In particular, a smaller impact is observed in the full 
sample of unemployed workers (increased by between 1.08 months and 1.75 months, panel B), 
the older (age 35 or above) unemployed workers (increased by between 1.02 months and 1.27 
months, panel C), the educated (some college or above) unemployed workers (increased by 
between 1.52 months and 2.38 months, panel D), the older educated unemployed workers 
(increased by between 1.59 months and 2.15 months, panel E), and the married (spouse present 
or absent) unemployed workers (increased by between 0.96 month and 1.46 months, panel F).  
I provide the following explanations for the observed impact. The reason for the increase 
in older and married participants could be attributed to the likeliness of having unemployed 
workers with high medical costs and, therefore, higher insurance premiums subsidized. Next, the 
educated unemployed workers will have a longer unemployment duration because they will have 
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much lower unemployed costs due to the subsidy and better comprehension of the complex 
policies. Lastly, the older educated unemployed individuals may have much lower overall 
unemployed cost because of both a higher premium subsidy and smaller information cost.  
Table 1.3 presents the results for all three cohorts from estimating Eq. (2) by controlling 
the covariates. In this regression, the coefficient on SUBSIDY, β (subsidy effect), is again positive 
and statistically significant across all three cohorts and it measures the average percentage 
difference in duration of unemployment between the subsidy-eligible and the subsidy-ineligible 
unemployed workers, given the same levels of age, race, marital status, education level, sex, and 
number of own children less than 18 years old in the family.  
Table 1.3 has six panels; in all six cases comparisons are made relative to subsidy-
ineligible unemployed workers conditional on underlying preferences for insurance. In panel A, 
the COBRA subsidy-eligible unemployed workers are predicted to significantly increase 
unemployment duration by between 24.45 percent and 34.76 percent. Results in panels B to F 
show that the subsidy also had a significant predicted impact on the following subsidy-eligible 
groups: the full sample (increased by between 13.03 percent and 24.46 percent, panel B), the 
older (increased by between 12.37 percent and 18.18 percent, panel C), the educated (increased 
by between 21.72 percent and 35.19 percent, panel D), the older educated (increased by between 
20.49 percent and 32.78 percent, panel E), and the married unemployed individuals (increased by 
between 17.64 percent and 20.11 percent, panel F). These results are also consistent with the 
predictions of job search theory. 
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5.3 Unemployment Insurance benefits 
Some may argue that the subsidy effect on unemployment duration is partially or completely 
driven by these Unemployment Insurance (UI) extensions, concerned that UI provides a 
disincentive to search for work. However, such estimated disincentive effects have typically been 
small (Katz, 2010 and Card and Levine, 2000). Further, the literature suggests that the UI effect 
on job search behavior is likely even smaller in recessions.8 As an example, workers who are 
eligible for unemployment insurance during the current recession are finding jobs at a nearly 
identical rate to those who are ineligible (Valletta and Kuang, 2010). 
Typically, unemployed workers can receive up to 26 weeks of benefits, as long as they 
continue to search for work. In 2008, Congress created Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation (EUC) recognizing that unemployed workers were having a significantly more 
difficult time finding jobs than in a non-recession climate. Later, Congress extended and 
expanded the program by providing 100 percent federal funding of Extended Benefits (EB) after 
the labor market worsened. Individuals are eligible for EB once they exhaust their EUC benefits 
if their states meet certain unemployment-based triggers. Thus, an unemployed worker could 
receive up to 99 weeks of coverage in those states with the highest rates of unemployment 
(Council of Economic Advisers report, 2010).9  
In order to control UI benefits, an extended version of Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) are estimated: 
 
DURATION* = α + β*SUBSIDY + δ*X + λ*UI + u, u ~ i.i.d. N (0, σ2)   (1’) 
LOG (DURATION)* = α + β*SUBSIDY + δ*X + λ*UI + u, u ~ i.i.d. N (0, σ2),   (2’) 
 
                                                 
8 See Kroft and Notowidigdo (2010) and Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender (2010). 
9 See Table A1 for more detail on these programs. 
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where UI is an indicator for how many number of weeks of UI benefits an unemployed 
individual can receive given the state he or she resides in. Therefore, by controlling UI benefits, 
this specification can also control the labor market conditions among states since many of the 
eligible weeks of benefits are determined at the state level by thresholds based on states’ 
unemployment rate. That is, the maximum length of coverage provided by these federal 
programs is shorter in states with better economies. 
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present the results from estimating Eq. (1’) and Eq. (2’), in all three 
cohorts conditional on underlying preferences for insurance and unemployment insurance 
benefits varying among states. These results show that the subsidy effect on unemployment 
duration is robust to unemployment insurance benefits, which further confirms that the subsidy 
effect on the duration of unemployment is mainly from the ARRA. The evidence in Tables 1.4 
and 1.5 is consistent with Gruber and Madrian’s study; the insignificant relationship between 
months of COBRA and the UI maximum benefit indicates that omitted variable bias from not 
simultaneously modeling the UI system should be minimal (Gruber and Madrian, 1997).  
 
5.4 Robustness checks 
5.4.1 Analysis of Subsidy selection by unemployed workers  
Due to the availability of the health insurance premium subsidy, workers who are eligible for this 
benefit if they become unemployed may not financially need their jobs to the same degree as 
workers who are not eligible because the eligible unemployed will have the cost of 
unemployment reduced. Therefore, this subsidy may provide a disincentive for potentially 
eligible workers. For example, the potentially eligible workers may feel less financial 
pressure/obligation to maintain their employment if they are eligible to receive the subsidy. 
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Whereas workers who are ineligible for the subsidy may have a financial need to stay employed, 
and therefore workers who are eligible for the subsidy may be more secure with the threat of 
unemployment. For instance, an employee, whose primary motivation to work is for the 
availability of affordable health insurance, may have less incentive to work if a health care 
subsidy is available outside employment.  
Table 1.6 presents the unemployment rate and incoming unemployed workers (UW) rate 
from February 2010 to August 2010.10  In order to identify whether there is any selection into the 
premium subsidy between subsidy-eligible and subsidy-ineligible, I define UW as the number of 
unemployed workers who enter the unemployment pool, and TU as the total unemployed 
workers. Further, I define the UW rate=(UW/TU)·100. Since the unemployment rate (seasonally 
adjusted) stays roughly unchanged (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010), I can use the UW rate to 
represent the inflow of unemployment. If unemployed workers purposely lose their jobs to obtain 
the subsidy, the UW rate should be high at/before the end of subsidy eligibility.  
During the subsidy-eligible period (February 2010 to May 2010), the coefficients are 
close to each other, which show that there is no “subsidy selection” behavior happening for 
potential eligible employed workers. Intuitively, given the severe labor market conditions during 
this time period, workers would not switch jobs easily for a health insurance premium subsidy. 
Besides, after the subsidy eligible period, the coefficients are also close to each other from July 
to August except for June. Two reasons may potentially explain why there is a spike for the UW 
rate in June. First, the difference of the unemployment rate (not seasonally adjusted) between 
May and June is 0.3 percent (9.6 percent -9.3 percent) representing 0.46 million unemployed 
workers. That is, the inflow of unemployment in June will be higher than the inflow of 
unemployment in May. Second, the difference in UW rate between May and June may depend 
                                                 
10 These are author calculations using the 2008 SIPP panel. 
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particularly on seasonal influences, which is why it is important to use a statistical method to 
remove the seasonal component of a time series (e.g., unemployment rate) to analyze non-
seasonal trends.  
Therefore, I check whether there is a seasonal component for the UW rate between May 
and June using the data from different years, 2009 and 2011. Table 1.7 shows that the differences 
in the UW rate between May and June in 2009 and 2011 are 2.72 percent and 3.82 percent, 
respectively, which are close to the difference in the UW rate between May and June in 2010 
(3.83 percent). Therefore, these results indicate that there are seasonal components happening 
with a similar magnitude during the May-June time period each year in SIPP. In sum, after 
taking seasonal fluctuation into account, these results imply that there is no subsidy selection 
between subsidy-eligible and subsidy-ineligible. 
 
5.4.2 Seasonality check within COBRA eligible group 
After checking seasonal components during the May-June time period each year in SIPP, I take 
one more step to further check whether this seasonality would affect the magnitude for the 
COBRA eligible group or not by looking at the data from the years 2009 and 2011, which were 
not subsidy eligible periods. Therefore, if the subsidy effect within the COBRA eligible group is 
insignificant for 2009 and 2011, that means the subsidy effect of the main results are driven by 
the ARRA COBRA subsidy. As Table 1.8 shows, the results are not significant and that means 
the seasonality is not affecting my main results. 
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5.4.3 Subsidy effect on unemployment duration of COBRA ineligible group 
After confirming that there is no “subsidy selection” behavior happening between subsidy-
eligible and subsidy-ineligible groups, I want to estimate the subsidy effect on the duration of 
unemployment for the COBRA in-eligible group using a placebo test. This test allows me to 
evaluate how likely it is to find a “false positive” when studying the ARRA COBRA premium 
subsidy effect. If I was to find a significant effect even in the group that had not been eligible for 
the subsidy, it would signal that the effects estimated in the COBRA eligible group may be 
spurious. I perform the placebo test using the COBRA ineligible group. Table 1.9 shows that 
there is no significant subsidy effect within the COBRA in-eligible group and the results further 
confirm that the subsidy effect on the duration of unemployment for the COBRA eligible group 
is mainly from ARRA. 
 
5.4.4 Monthly variation and false end of subsidy eligibility 
The false end of subsidy eligibility is set to see whether there is any subsidy effect on the 
duration of unemployment. During the subsidy-eligible period, January 2010 is set as the false 
end of subsidy eligibility; beyond the subsidy-eligible period, August 2010 is set as the false end 
of subsidy eligibility. I use two different unemployed cohorts who lost their jobs to investigate 
the effect of the premium subsidy on the duration of unemployment under the false end of 
subsidy eligibility scenario during, and beyond the subsidy-eligible period, respectively. The 
results in panel A in Table 1.10 show that the predicted subsidy effect is much smaller and 
insignificant under the false end of subsidy eligibility compared to the right end of subsidy 
eligibility, May 31st, 2010. Taking Jan’10 as the false end during the original subsidy-eligible 
period, the new subsidy-eligible/ineligible group can be established (Dec’09-Jan’10/Feb’10-
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Mar’10). After controlling for underlying preference and UI, this group has negative and much 
smaller coefficients, which further show there is no subsidy effect on the false end of subsidy 
eligibility. Similarly, taking Aug’10 as the false end beyond the original subsidy-eligible period, 
the new subsidy-eligible/ineligible group can be established (Jun’10-Jul’10/Aug’10-Sep’10). 
After controlling the covariates and UI, this group also has negative and much smaller 
coefficients.  
Some may argue that the effect of the premium subsidy on the duration of unemployment 
is driven by the variation between monthly cohorts. I employ two different unemployed 
neighboring cohorts to see the subsidy effect on the unemployment duration between monthly 
cohorts during and beyond the subsidy-eligible period, respectively. Panel B in Table 1.10 
indicates that the subsidy effect from monthly variation is much smaller and insignificant 
compared to the results of the May/June cohort in Table 1.2. Similarly, the percentage 
differences of the subsidy effect are also much smaller and insignificant. 
In sum, two things are indicated. First, there is no significant subsidy effect under the 
false end of subsidy eligibility, and the results further confirm that the subsidy effect on the 
duration of unemployment is mainly from the ARRA. Second, it shows that the main results are 
not driven by the variations between monthly cohorts because the variations between monthly 
cohorts are relatively small compared to the main results presented in Tables 1.2 and 1.3. 
 
5.4.5 Unemployment exit rate at the end of COBRA/COBRA subsidy 
Meyer (1990) finds the probability of leaving unemployment rises dramatically just prior to 
when benefits lapse. In order to check whether this scenario is happening here, results in Table 
1.11 show the spell length for the subsidy-eligible and COBRA-eligible (i.e., subsidy-ineligible) 
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groups. In order to make the estimates be more reliable and precise, I add the number of 
individuals who become unemployed from Jan. 2010 to May 2010 and those are eligible for the 
15-month premium subsidy. Likewise, I add the number of individuals who become unemployed 
from June 2010 to Dec. 2010 and those are eligible for 18-month COBRA premium. If the 
unemployed workers are having high probability of leaving unemployment at the end of the 
benefit, then we expect to see that there will be a spike when the benefits stop. The results in 
Table 1.11 show that there is no spike for the subsidy-eligible group when the spell length is 
equal to 15 months (i.e., the end of subsidy) and there is also no spike for the COBRA-eligible 
group when the spell length is equal to 18 months. These results confirm that there is no leaving 
unemployment behavior when benefits lapse. 
 
6. Implication in terms of UI 
This study suggests that the subsidy had a positive statistically significant impact on the 
unemployment duration for subsidy-eligible unemployed workers. A tremendous amount of 
literature exists about how UI affects the unemployment duration. In this section, I will discuss 
how the UI literature can help us interpret the results obtained from the ARRA COBRA 
premium subsidy study.  
Katz and Meyer (1990) indicate that if the benefit level is reduced by 10 percent it 
decreases the predicted mean weeks of unemployment by 1.5 weeks. The average unemployment 
benefit is about $300 per week in 2010, 2011, and 2012 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 
2013). That is, a potential increase of $30 extra in UI benefit will lead to an increase by 1.5 
weeks in unemployment duration. In this study, the COBRA premium subsidy-eligible 
unemployed workers significantly increased the predicted mean month of unemployment by 2.11 
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months. As a result, the predicted mean month of extended unemployment duration resulting 
from the premium subsidy is equivalent to the effect of increasing UI benefits by 56 percent.11  
 
7. Conclusion 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 provided a 65 percent health 
insurance premium subsidy for workers who lost their jobs involuntarily and elected to take up 
COBRA coverage. This paper shows that the COBRA premium subsidy-eligible unemployed 
workers significantly increased unemployment duration conditional on underlying factors 
influencing their individual preferences for insurance and UI benefits. Moreover, the subsidy had 
a significant but smaller impact on the duration of unemployment for the following groups: full 
sample, married, older, educated, and older-educated unemployed individuals. These empirical 
results are consistent with the predictions of job search theory. 
The behavioral responses to financial incentives are interesting from a scientific point of 
view because they allow me to investigate to what extent results are coherent with theoretical 
predictions. Theory provides predictions about the search intensity behavior pattern over the 
duration of unemployment. However, theoretical prediction only provides a description about the 
direction of the effects, but could not provide a rough estimate of their magnitude. With 
reference to the behavioral reaction of subsidy-eligible unemployed workers, these responses 
give some ideas about the potential degree of unemployment duration. 
From a policy point of view this study is interesting as well. Extending the COBRA 
premium subsidy for individuals who experience such a loss in health insurance coverage when 
they become unemployed may correct market deficiencies (Gruber and Madrian, 1997). 
However, this study shows the government intervention has unintended side effects such as 
                                                 
11 (2.11*4/1.5)*$30=$168; ($168/$300)*100%=56% 
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distorting employment decisions. This cost of lengthening the duration of unemployment must 
be weighed against the benefit which may be a more productive job search for higher paying 
positions from Ehrenberg and Oaxaca’s study. However, in my study, I notice that there is no 
relation between a longer unemployment duration and higher post-employment wages. Therefore,  
there is much room here for future study.  
While there has been a tremendous amount of literature on how Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) affects the unemployed workers’ job search behavior, there has been no previous 
study on how the health insurance premium subsidy affects the unemployed workers’ job search 
behavior. This study fills this gap and finds that the extended unemployment duration resulting 
from the premium subsidy is equivalent to the effect of increasing UI benefits by 56 percent 
which indicates that the COBRA premium subsidy is having an important impact on the 
unemployed workers’ job transition behavior.  
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Table 1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Unemployed cohorts (March 2010-August-2010) 
Variable 
Subsidy-eligible (before 
May 31st, 2010)   
Subsidy-ineligible (after 
May 31st, 2010) 
  # of individuals Mean   # of individuals Mean 
COBRA eligible 
Duration (May/June) 42 8.357 62 6.468 
Duration (April-May/June-July) 80 9.000 101 7.029 
Duration (Mar-May/June-Aug) 126 9.579 139 7.381 
Full Sample 
Duration (May/June) 299 8.806 406 7.431 
Duration (April-May/June-July) 555 8.863 733 7.873 
Duration (Mar-May/June-Aug) 867 8.850 1038 7.835 
Demographic characteristics 
Full sample (Mar-May/June-Aug) 
Age (years) 40.38 40.36 
Female (%) 42.09 41.81 
Non-white (%) 22.49 20.42 
Education 40.12 40.18 
Married (%) 39.56 41.32 
# of own children 0.63 0.62 
# of individuals   867     1038 
Note: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010 shows that the average (mean) duration is 34.6 weeks (8.65 months) for 2010 
and 40.2 weeks (10.05 months) for January 2011. 
May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. 
Variable definitions: Duration = completed spell duration; Education= highest education level attained, 40 here 
indicates some college or above; Married = married with spouse present or absent; # of own children = number of 
own children less than 18 years old in family. 
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Unemployed cohorts (March 2010-August-2010) 
Variable 
Subsidy-eligible (before 
May 31st, 2010)   
Subsidy-ineligible (after 
May 31st, 2010) 
  # of individuals Mean   # of individuals Mean 
Older  
Duration (May/June) 161 8.373 231 7.229 
Duration (April-May/June-July) 307 8.736 414 7.778 
Duration (Mar-May/June-Aug) 498 9.122 581 7.840 
Educated 
Duration (May/June) 172 8.994 224 6.763 
Duration (April-May/June-July) 308 9.136 417 7.439 
Duration (Mar-May/June-Aug) 484 8.888 572 7.460 
Older educated 
Duration (May/June) 94 8.394 136 6.074 
Duration (April-May/June-July) 176 8.898 254 7.063 
Duration (Mar-May/June-Aug) 290 8.965 351 7.362 
Married 
Duration (May/June) 119 7.445 170 6.559 
Duration (April-May/June-July) 222 7.883 300 6.890 
Duration (Mar-May/June-Aug) 343 8.184   429 6.737 
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Figure 1.1 Spell distribution for Subsidy-eligible group 
 
Note: The sample is from the unemployed cohorts (March 2010-May 2010) within COBRA eligible group.  
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Figure 1.2 Spell distribution for Subsidy-ineligible group 
 
Note: The sample is from the unemployed cohorts (June 2010-Aug. 2010) within COBRA eligible group. 
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Table 1.2 Subsidy effect on unemployment duration using Tobit 
Subsidy-eligible / Subsidy-ineligible (control covariates) 
Spell Length (month) 
May/June April-May/June-July Mar-May/June-Aug 
Panel A: COBRA eligible 
Subsidy effect 2.1863 2.0996 2.6222 
[1.6972] [1.307]* [1.1363]** 
# of individuals 104 181 265 
Panel B: Full sample 
Subsidy effect 1.7587 1.2366 1.0836 
[0.8306]** [0.6338]** [0.5573]** 
# of individuals 705 1288 1905 
Panel C: Older  
Subsidy effect 1.1833 1.0282 1.2774 
[0.985] [0.7541] [0.6634]* 
# of individuals 392 721 1079 
Panel D: Educated 
Subsidy effect 2.3868 1.8974 1.5226 
[0.9246]*** [0.7325]*** [0.6213]** 
# of individuals 396 725 1056 
Panel E: Older educated 
Subsidy effect 2.1557 1.9494 1.596 
[1.0314]** [0.8459]** (0.7306)** 
# of individuals 230 430 641 
Panel F: Married 
Subsidy effect 0.9603 1.0675 1.4697 
[0.8923] [0.7356] [0.6214]** 
# of individuals 289 522 772 
Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. Robust standard error is in square brackets. 
***   Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test. 
**     Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test. 
*       Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test. 
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Table 1.3 Subsidy effect on log unemployment duration using Tobit 
Subsidy-eligible / Subsidy-ineligible (control covariates) 
Log [Spell Length (month)] 
May/June April-May/June-July Mar-May/June-Aug 
Panel A: COBRA eligible 
Subsidy effect 0.2848 0.2445 0.3476 
[0.2375] [0.1813] [0.1542]** 
# of individuals 104 181 265 
Panel B: Full sample 
Subsidy effect 0.2446 0.162 0.1303 
[0.1131]** [0.0864]* [0.0723]* 
# of individuals 705 1288 1905 
Panel C: Older  
Subsidy effect 0.1818 0.1237 0.1488 
[0.1385] [0.1051] [0.0879]* 
# of individuals 392 721 1079 
Panel D: Educated 
Subsidy effect 0.3519 0.2832 0.2172 
[0.1248]*** [0.1004]*** [0.0836]*** 
# of individuals 396 725 1056 
Panel E: Older educated 
Subsidy effect 0.3278 0.2572 0.2049 
[0.1442]** [0.1185]** [0.1012]** 
# of individuals 230 430 641 
Panel F: Married 
Subsidy effect 0.1935 0.1764 0.2011 
[0.1336] [0.1071]* [0.0881]** 
# of individuals 289 522 772 
Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. Robust standard error is in square brackets. 
***   Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test. 
**     Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test. 
*       Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test. 
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Table 1.4 Subsidy effect on unemployment duration using Tobit and controlling for UI 
Subsidy-eligible / Subsidy-ineligible (control covariates) 
Spell Length (month) 
May/June April-May/June-July Mar-May/June-Aug 
Panel A: COBRA eligible 
Subsidy effect 2.1196 2.1137 2.6255 
[1.7165] [1.3055]* [1.1354]** 
# of individuals 104 181 265 
Panel B: Full sample 
Subsidy effect 1.7587 1.2366 1.1032 
[0.8306]** [0.6338]** [0.5567]** 
# of individuals 705 1288 1905 
Panel C: Older  
Subsidy effect 1.1063 1.0276 1.2729 
[0.987] [0.7542] [0.6631]* 
# of individuals 392 721 1079 
Panel D: Educated 
Subsidy effect 2.2623 1.8767 1.5328 
[0.9312]** [0.7305]*** [0.6206]** 
# of individuals 396 725 1056 
Panel E: Older educated 
Subsidy effect 1.8147 1.9003 1.5824 
[1.0497]* [0.8478]** (0.7326)** 
# of individuals 230 430 641 
Panel F: Married 
Subsidy effect 0.9406 1.0572 1.4554 
[0.8921] [0.7362] [0.6204]** 
# of individuals 289 522 772 
Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. Robust standard error is in square brackets. 
UI=unemployment insurance 
***   Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test. 
**     Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test. 
*       Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test. 
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Table 1.5 Subsidy effect on log unemployment duration using Tobit and controlling for UI 
Subsidy-eligible / Subsidy-ineligible (control covariates) 
Log [Spell Length (month)] 
May/June April-May/June-July Mar-May/June-Aug 
Panel A: COBRA eligible 
Subsidy effect 0.2713 0.2473 0.3479 
[0.2379] [0.1812] [0.1542]** 
# of individuals 104 181 265 
Panel B: Full sample 
Subsidy effect 0.2446 0.162 0.1336 
[0.1131]** [0.0864]* [0.0721]* 
# of individuals 705 1288 1905 
Panel C: Older  
Subsidy effect 0.1681 0.1237 0.1483 
[0.1385] [0.1051] [0.0879]* 
# of individuals 392 721 1079 
Panel D: Educated 
Subsidy effect 0.329 0.2812 0.2191 
[0.1259]*** [0.1003]*** [0.0836]*** 
# of individuals 396 725 1056 
Panel E: Older educated 
Subsidy effect 0.2663 0.2487 0.2026 
[0.1456]* [0.119]** [0.1014]** 
# of individuals 230 430 641 
Panel F: Married 
Subsidy effect 0.19 0.175 0.1991 
[0.1334] [0.1072]* [0.0886]** 
# of individuals 289 522 772 
Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. Robust standard error is in square brackets. 
UI=unemployment insurance 
***   Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test. 
**     Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test. 
*       Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test. 
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Table 1.6 Subsidy selection check by unemployed worker groups 
2010 Feb. Mar. April May June July Aug. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(Unadj) Unemployment rate 10.4 10.2 9.5 9.3 9.6 9.7 9.5 
(Adj) Unemployment rate (%) 9.8 9.9 9.9 9.6 9.4 9.5 9.5 
COBRA eligible 
Total Unemployed 344 333 324 306 310 281 282 
New Unemployed workers 46 46 38 42 62 39 38 
New Unemployed workers (%) 13.37 13.81 11.73 13.73 20.00 13.88 13.48 
COBRA ineligible 
Total Unemployed 4678 4624 4244 4083 4425 4260 4161 
New Unemployed workers 379 403 322 375 569 421 384 
New Unemployed workers (%) 8.10 8.71 7.58 9.18 12.85 9.88 9.22 
Full sample 
Total Unemployed 5022 4957 4568 4389 4735 4541 4443 
New Unemployed workers 425 449 360 417 631 460 422 
New Unemployed workers (%) 8.46 9.06 7.88 9.50 13.33 10.13 9.50 
Older 
Total Unemployed 2848 2820 2589 2,439 2583 2517 2460 
New Unemployed workers 235 272 223 225 385 263 229 
New Unemployed workers (%) 8.25 9.65 8.61 9.23 14.91 10.45 9.31 
Educated 
Total Unemployed 2682 2695 2480 2409 2612 2511 2497 
New Unemployed workers 243 264 209 254 386 278 241 
New Unemployed workers (%) 9.06 9.80 8.43 10.54 14.78 11.07 9.65 
Older educated 
Total Unemployed 1656 1652 1519 1442 1550 1510 1501 
New Unemployed workers 149 168 137 138 242 171 147 
New Unemployed workers (%) 9.00 10.17 9.02 9.57 15.61 11.32 9.79 
Married 
Total Unemployed 2059 2023 1828 1729 1853 1813 1778 
New Unemployed workers 180 196 174 194 309 214 184 
New Unemployed workers (%) 8.74 9.69 9.52 11.22 16.68 11.80 10.35 
Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. (Unadj) Unemployment rate= not seasonally 
adjusted unemployment rate. (Adj) Unemployment rate=seasonally adjusted unemployment rate. 
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Table 1.7 Subsidy selection check by unemployed worker between May/June in 2009 and 2011 
2009 2011 
  May June   May June 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(Unadj) Unemployment rate 9.1 9.7 8.7 9.3 
(Adj) Unemployment rate 9.4 9.5 9 9.1 
Full sample 
Total Unemployed 4782 5089 3755 3923 
New Unemployed workers 557 731 356 522 
New Unemployed workers (%) 11.64 14.36 9.48 13.30 
Note: (Unadj) Unemployment rate= not seasonally adjusted unemployment rate. (Adj) Unemployment 
rate=seasonally adjusted unemployment rate. 
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Table 1.8 Seasonality check within COBRA eligible group between May/June in 2009 and 2011 
using Tobit 
Subsidy-eligible vs. Subsidy-ineligible 
Spell Length (month) 
2009 2011 
May/June May/June 
COBRA eligible 
Subsidy effect 0.1194 0.2408 
[1.6124] [1.6487] 
# of individuals 119   63 
Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. 
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Table 1.9 Subsidy effect on unemployment duration using Tobit for COBRA in-eligible group 
Subsidy-eligible vs. Subsidy-ineligible 
Spell Length (month) 
2010 May/June April-May/June-July Mar-May/June-Aug 
COBRA in-eligible 
Subsidy effect -0.5649 -0.0995 0.1199 
[0.3598] [0.2719] [0.2232] 
# of individuals 601 1107 1640 
Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. Robust standard error is in square brackets. 
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Table 1.10 False end of subsidy eligibility and monthly variation checks using Tobit 
Subsidy-eligible vs. Subsidy-ineligible 
Panel A: False end of subsidy eligibility check 
Jan'10 Aug'10 
Dec'09-Jan'10/ Feb'10-Mar'10 Jul'10-Aug'10/ Sep'10-Oct'10 
Spell Log [Spell] Spell Log [Spell] 
Subsidy Effect -0.0252 -0.0107 -0.0457 -0.0494 
[0.7494] [0.0921] [0.7557] [0.1125] 
# of individuals 1456 1235 
Panel B: Monthly variation check       
Jan'10/ Feb'10 Aug'10/ Sep'10 
Spell Log [Spell] Spell Log [Spell] 
Subsidy effect 0.4727 0.0453 0.0261 -0.0438 
[1.3154] [0.1581] [0.9929] [0.155] 
# of individuals 638 621 
Note: May 31st, 2010 is the end of ARRA COBRA subsidy eligibility. Robust standard error is in square brackets. 
UI=unemployment insurance 
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Table 1.11 Unemployment exit rate at the end of COBRA/COBRA subsidy check 
Spell Length (month) 
Subsidy-eligible 
(individuals) Percent   
COBRA-eligible 
(individuals) Percent 
1 29 17.68% 35 21.08% 
2 23 14.02% 25 15.06% 
3 15 9.15% 15 9.04% 
4 26 15.85% 26 15.66% 
5 11 6.71% 12 7.23% 
6 4 2.44% 16 9.64% 
7 5 3.05% 4 2.41% 
8 8 4.88% 6 3.61% 
9 4 2.44% 9 5.42% 
10 2 1.22% 3 1.81% 
11 6 3.66% 3 1.81% 
12 3 1.83% 1 0.60% 
13 5 3.05% 4 2.41% 
14 1 0.61% 1 0.60% 
15 4 2.44% 3 1.81% 
16 1 0.61% 2 1.20% 
17 4 2.44% 1 0.60% 
18 3 1.83% 0 0.00% 
19 5 3.05% 0 0.00% 
20 1 0.61% 0 0.00% 
21 2 1.22% 0 0.00% 
23 1 0.61% 0 0.00% 
25 1 0.61% 0 0.00% 
    
Total individuals 164     166   
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Table 1.A1 Details and schedule of Unemployment Insurance coverage 
Panel A: Details coverage       
Program Length (weeks) Eligibility 
State Unemployment Insurance 26 all 
  Tier 1 20 all 
Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation Tier 2 14 all 
  Tier 3 13 
state unemployment rate > 
6% 
  Tier 4 6 
state unemployment rate > 
8.5% 
    
Extended Benefits Option 1 13 
state unemployment rate > 
6.5% 
  Option 2 20 
state unemployment rate > 
8% 
    
Panel B: Benefits schedule       
Unemployment rate (U) Length (weeks) 
U <= 6 60 
6 < U <= 6.5 73 
6.5 < U < 8.1 86 
8 < U < 8.6 93 
U > 8.5   99 
Note: The schedule in Panel B is author’s calculation 
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CHAPTER 2.The Impact of the Health Care Reform on the Applications for Disability Benefits: 
Evidence from Massachusetts 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), which provides benefits to those who are physically 
incapable of finding suitable work, is one of the largest income replacement programs in the 
United States. In 2009, there were 9.7 million program recipients, on which the government 
spent $124 billion in cash benefits and $70 billion in health care expenditures according to 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 2010. SSDI recipients receive a cash stipend that replaces, 
on average, 45 percent of their previous earnings. Moreover, they will receive Medicare 
coverage after a two-year waiting period. 
Autor and Duggan (2006) provide several potential reasons why the SSDI rolls grow so 
rapidly. First, the liberalization of Disability Insurance screening makes people suffering from 
back pain and mental illness eligible. Next, the rise in the replacement rate (the ratio of disability 
cash benefits to previous labor earnings) provides incentives for workers to seek benefits. Lastly, 
the interactions of the above two factors with a rapid increase in the female labor force 
participation explain the enormous growth of SSDI beneficiaries. 
However, the health insurance component of the SSDI program has not been the subject 
of much study except for Gruber and Kubik (2002). They find that potential SSDI beneficiaries 
tend to have high medical cost, and they also show that those who have an alternative source of 
insurance should they leave their job, are 26 to 74% more likely to apply for SSDI than those 
without such an alternative source of health insurance. On average health costs are particularly 
high for disabled individuals; in 2009, a SSDI recipient averaged $10,500 in Medicare health 
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costs, which is equivalent to more than 80 percent of the average yearly SSDI cash benefit (CBO, 
2010). The health insurance component of SSDI is therefore particularly valuable to these 
disabled individuals. Thus, the 2006 Massachusetts health reform is likely to influence the 
application rates for SSDI benefits, but whether it will result in more or fewer beneficiaries is 
difficult to predict. Among other changes, the legislation will make it easier for people with 
health problems to buy their own insurance; it will also provide new subsidies for individually 
purchased coverage and expand eligibility for Medicaid.  
 This paper focuses on the hypothesis that the probability of applying for SSDI for 
spouses without ESI will be higher compared to spouses with ESI coverage after the reform. The 
differential is probable because potential beneficiaries for SSDI coverage who have stopgap 
forms of health coverage are substantially more likely to apply for disability than potential 
applicants who would lose other insurance coverage while awaiting eligibility for the disability-
related Medicare benefit. Understanding and quantifying the effects of health reform on the 
disability insurance program is important because it will improve our ability to explain and 
manage the increasing costs of the SSDI programs in terms of new beneficiaries and the size of 
future caseloads.  
I estimate the causal effect of the reform on SSDI beneficiaries using data from the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). This survey follows a sample of persons for 
four to five years, collecting data on their monthly SSDI beneficiary status, and spousal health 
insurance status across the time period before and after the implementation of the health reform. 
I evaluate the effect of the ESI expansion on the change of SSDI beneficiaries’ rate using 
the near-universal expansion of health insurance coverage happening in Massachusetts in 2006. 
Massachusetts simultaneously implemented premium credits to low- and middle-income 
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residents. I perform a behavioral analysis that utilizes the variation in the intensity of the impact 
of the reform across potential SSDI applicants. Potential SSDI applicants who are affected by the 
ESI expansion will have more incentive to move onto SSDI rolls than the individuals who are 
not affected by the ESI expansion. Additionally, I compare potential SSDI beneficiaries in 
Massachusetts to similar counterparts in six nearby states. Exploiting the variation in treatment 
intensity allows me to identify how expanding private insurance coverage affected SSDI 
beneficiaries in a way that is robust to Massachusetts-specific time trends. 
I have several findings. I find that for spouses without ESI, the positive effect of the ESI 
expansion on SSDI participation is 0.98 percentage points stronger than it is for spouses with ESI. 
These estimates imply that spouses without ESI are associated with higher SSDI beneficiaries 
which accounts for a 10.7 percentage point increase in SSDI beneficiaries in Massachusetts after 
the reform. Moreover, my estimates imply an elasticity of spouses without ESI with respect to 
SSDI beneficiaries of 0.0913. 
This rest of the paper is laid out in five sections. Section 2 gives an overview of the SSDI 
program in the US and the ESI expansion in Massachusetts. This is followed by Section 3, which 
discusses the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results for the impact of 2006 
health reform on SSDI participation decisions, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 Social Security Disability Insurance 
SSDI provides insurance for those persons who have an "inability to engage in any substantial 
gainful activity by reason of physical or mental impairment" and this impairment must be 
expected to last at least 12 months or result in death. Most applicants must have worked 20 of the 
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40 quarters prior to the onset of disability to be eligible to apply for SSDI. Moreover, an 
application for SSDI cannot be made unless the applicant has been out of work for at least five 
months. After a waiting period of two years, SSDI recipients are eligible for Medicare coverage, 
which is a very valuable benefit for the disabled with high medical costs.  
 
2.2 Employer Sponsored Health Insurance expansions 
Measuring the causal impact of insurance is notoriously difficult because it requires finding 
exogenous sources of variation in insurance status. The natural experiment in this paper is a 
particularly relevant source of credible exogenous variation to study the effect of private health 
insurance on SSDI participation. In 2006, Massachusetts restructured the way private insurance 
is purchased and sold to expand health insurance coverage to nearly all state residents. 
Massachusetts combined an individual mandate to purchase insurance with a major expansion of 
the Medicaid program and new subsidies for individuals earning up to 300 percent of the federal 
poverty line. Under the new law, all residents must meet minimum health insurance coverage (to 
avoid the loss of personal income tax exemption, $219 in 2007, with additional monthly 
penalties which are based on 50 percent of the cost for the lowest-priced available insurance plan 
beginning in 2008) when affordable coverage is available. For a detailed description of the 
reform, see Gruber (2008) or Raymond (2007). 
In addition to the mandate, Massachusetts dramatically increased free and subsidized 
coverage to low-income households via the “MassHealth" Medicaid program, which expanded 
eligibility for low-income individuals and children. Massachusetts also introduced a new 
program, “Commonwealth Care," that subsidized private insurance to individuals earning up to 
300 percent of the federal poverty line (with the level of subsidies based on income) who are not 
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eligible for ESI or MassHealth. Massachusetts facilitates enrollment of individuals into both 
subsidized and unsubsidized insurance plans (Lischko, 2009). 
 
3. Data and empirical strategy 
3.1 Data 
The impact of the ESI expansion, part of 2006 Massachusetts health reform, on SSDI 
participation decisions is examined using data from both 2004 and 2008 panels of the SIPP, a 
nationally representative longitudinal survey in the United States.12 The 2004 SIPP panel enrolls 
persons from October 2003 through January 2004 and follows them for 48 months; whereas the 
2008 SIPP panel enrolls persons from May 2008 through August 2008 and follows them for 52 
months. The survey uses a 4-month recall period to conduct interviews every 4 months and 
provides their monthly SSDI beneficiary status and spousal health insurance status that allowed 
me to see the change of these two groups before and after the implementation of the health 
reform. Moreover, this paper relies on administrative data sets from 2003 to 2009 for the SSDI 
beneficiaries and population data from Social Security Administration (SSA) to calculate the 
percentage of SSDI beneficiaries among states. Therefore, I can use the administrative data to 
confirm the change of SSDI beneficiaries in SIPP.  
 
3.2 Empirical strategy 
My identification strategy relies on the assumption that, if the reform had not taken place, SSDI 
beneficiaries in potential eligible—and ineligible—applicants in Massachusetts would have 
evolved similarly. Taking advantage of the “natural experiment” that occurred in Massachusetts 
                                                 
12 The 2004 and 2008 SIPP panels can be used to produce state estimates. (SIPP USERS Guide, Chapter 10, Revisions 2009 Page 
40) 
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to compare the change in the SSDI beneficiaries among married couples ages 18 to 64 before and 
after the state implemented its health reform initiative, using Difference-in-Difference (DD) and 
Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference (DDD) method.13The estimation approach exploits 
variation over time (comparing pre-and post-reform time periods), across population groups 
(comparing SSDI potential applicants who are affected by ESI expansion to SSDI potential 
applicants who are not affected by ESI expansion), and across states (comparing Massachusetts 
to comparison states in the Northeast that did not implement health reform). 
Since Massachusetts implemented the health reform on April 2006 and the SSDI has a 5-
month waiting period plus the 19-month Medicare waiting period, my post-reform period using 
the SSA and SIPP begins in 2008. After defining the pre-and post-reform periods, I then 
compared the SSDI beneficiaries in the post-reform period of 2008-2009 to those beneficiaries in 
the pre-reform period of 2003–2005 among married couples.   
The comparison states provide an estimate of what would have happened in 
Massachusetts in the absence of health reform. Identifying an appropriate comparison state is 
difficult given the wide variation in state policies, programs and populations, and the frequency 
with which other states were also implementing program and policy changes that affected SSDI 
potential applicants over the study period. In this paper, I rely on four states in the New England 
division (1.New Hampshire, NH; 2.Vermont, VT; 3.Rhode Island, RI; and 4.Connecticut, CT) 
and two states in the Middle Atlantic division (5.New Jersey, NJ; 6.Pennsylvania, PA) in the 
Northeast region as comparison states. The comparison group provides an estimate of what 
would have happened in the absence of the ESI expansion within Massachusetts. The control 
group consists of people who have health insurance from their spouse’s group/employer plan 
because they can have health insurance whether this reform existed or not.  
                                                 
13 SIPP respondents are asked about the age to begin receiving Social Security Disability payments because of his/her disability. 
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To estimate the overall impact of health reform on SSDI participation decisions, I 
compared the change in the SSDI beneficiaries in Massachusetts to the change for a similar 
group in comparison states before and after the reform by using a DD framework. The 
comparison states control for underlying trends in the SSDI unrelated to health reform. 
Furthermore, I extend the analysis by comparing the DD estimate on the potential SSDI 
applicants who are affected by ESI expansion to an analogous DD estimate on the potential SSDI 
applicants who are not affected by ESI expansion using a DDD framework. 
 
4. The Impact of 2006 Health Reform on SSDI Participation Decisions 
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for two different periods (pre vs. post) and two 
different groups (USA vs. Massachusetts). One chart includes pre-reform SSDI beneficiaries, 
and the other consists of post-reform SSDI rolls. Two things are indicated. First, both the 
percentage of SSDI beneficiaries for US and Massachusetts are higher during the treatment 
period compared to the control period. In particular, the number of SSDI rolls in Massachusetts 
has increased more rapidly than the U.S. Second, the relatively low fraction of married female, 
nonwhite workers, and relatively young age is indicative of the difference between US and 
Massachusetts’ SSDI beneficiaries’ characteristics. In terms of average level of education, there 
is not much difference across all SSDI beneficiaries, and the average level of education is high 
school graduate.  
I use two types of variation to identify the effect of employer sponsored insurance 
coverage on SSDI participation decisions. First, I analyze the relative change in the rate of SSDI 
beneficiaries and the rate of spouses without ESI in Massachusetts based on their exposure to the 
reform compared to the rate of these two groups during the pre-reform period. Because the 
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reform instituted near-universal coverage, spouses without ESI have more incentive to apply for 
SSDI than spouses with ESI. We should expect to see the rate of SSDI beneficiaries increase 
because more potential SSDI applicants will try to apply when they have a stopgap form of 
health insurance which is available after the health reform was implemented. Second, I compare 
the variation in the rate of SSDI beneficiaries in Massachusetts with the variation in the 
comparison states of New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania. These estimates are robust to Massachusetts when it comes to specific shocks and 
differential trends in SSDI beneficiaries’ rate between Massachusetts and other states.  
 
4.1 Within Massachusetts analysis 
I first analyze the effect of the reform by comparing the number of SSDI beneficiaries before and 
after the health reform within Massachusetts, controlling for a number of characteristics of 
individuals that could affect preferences for applying for SSDI. Second, I exploit the variation 
across SSDI beneficiaries among married couples to identify the causal effect of the reform on 
SSDI beneficiaries. The basic models are of the forms: 
 
SSDI = α + β*T2 + δ*X + u   (1) 
Spouse w/o ESI = α + β*T2 + δ*X + u   (2) 
 
In this specification, SSDI and Spouse w/o ESI are the outcomes of interest. SSDI is a dummy 
variable indicating the age to begin receiving Social Security Disability payments because of 
his/her disability while Spouse w/o ESI indicates an individual who does not have insurance 
through their spouses’ group/employer plan. T2 is an indicator to capture the average effect of 
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the health reform on the SSDI beneficiaries/ Spouse w/o ESI rolls. The vector of control 
variables, X, represents individuals’ demographic and socioeconomic characteristics including 
ages, sex group, education levels, and race.  
 
P (SSDI=1|x) = F (β0 + β1 (Spouse w/o ESI) + β2T2+ β3T2· (Spouse w/o ESI) + δ*X) (3) 
 
When subjects in a treatment group and a control group are observed in both the pre-treatment 
and post-treatment periods and the pre-treatment time trends in the outcome variable, SSDI rolls, 
are not significantly different in the two groups, DD models can be used to estimate the effect of 
the treatment on the treated. One way to specify the model is by defining a variable T2 that is 
equal to one if the observation is from the post-treatment period, and zero if from the pre-
treatment period, and a variable Spouse w/o ESI that is equal to one if the observation is from the 
treatment group and zero if from the control group. 
The preference for SSDI arises from variations across age, sex group, education level, 
and race. Obviously each of these dimensions is correlated with preferences for SSDI, so the 
regression for every category could be controlled. Therefore, in this specification, identification 
comes from the variation in the treatment group within these categories. That is, this approach 
uses the fact that the health reform changes for the spouse with ESI versus the spouse without 
ESI over time.  
Next, a more aggregate approach is taken to look at the effect of health reform on the 
change of SSDI beneficiaries during a seven-year period. That is, a sample of SSDI beneficiaries 
is taken from 2003 to 2009. After pooling all data across years, the estimates are reliable and 
precise, and the results are consistent across years.  
51 
 
 
 
This paper mainly focuses on the married sample. Before looking at the results from the 
married sample, we need to look at the whole sample to verify the generality of the estimation. 
Further, I generate SSDI beneficiaries’ rates per-capita by dividing the number of SSDI 
beneficiaries in a given year by the SSA's estimated county population. Consequently, I compare 
the percentage change of SSDI beneficiaries between SIPP and SSA data during the pre- and 
post- reform period. Thus, the panel A of Table 2.2 presents the estimates of equation (1) for the 
whole sample to show that the SSDI beneficiaries from SIPP significantly increase by between 
0.358 (un-weighted) and 0.561 (weighted) percentage points which are close to the percentage 
change of SSDI beneficiaries (0.55 percentage points) from SSA (see the appendix).  
Next, for the married sample, panel B shows that the SSDI beneficiaries increase 
significantly by 0.4 percentage points while the group of spouses without ESI increases by 4.38 
percentage points significantly after the health reform. The percentage change among SSDI 
beneficiaries, and spouses without ESI, helps calculate the elasticity between these two groups. 
A 0.4 percent increase in SSDI beneficiaries is associated with a 4.38 percent increase in spouses 
without ESI coverage, which translates into an elasticity estimate of 0.0913. 
Lastly, in order to estimate the impact of the ESI expansion on SSDI participation 
decision in Massachusetts, I investigate the behavior of SSDI potential applicants in treatment 
group in a regression framework using equation (3). I expect to see the positive significant 
coefficients on interaction term because more intensive ESI expansion from the health reform 
may have led potential SSDI applicants who are affected by ESI to have much more incentive to 
move onto SSDI rolls. Panel C presents estimates of the effect on the treatment group after the 
health reform for the rate of SSDI beneficiaries ages 18 to 64. As expected, the coefficients of 
interest are positive and significantly different from zero. Moreover, the marginal effect is 
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0.0098. That is, a 1 percent increase in the group of spouses without ESI, and means that the 
SSDI beneficiaries will increase by 0.0098 percent. Recalled from panel A, the group of spouses 
without ESI increased by 4.38 percent which means the predicted SSDI beneficiaries will 
increase by 4.38*0.0098 percent=0.0429 percent which accounts for 10.73 percent 
(0.000429/0.004=0.1073) of total SSDI beneficiaries increase. 
 
4.2 The impact of health reform on Massachusetts across states 
In order to estimate the effect of health reform on Massachusetts compared to other neighboring 
states, extended version of Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) are estimated:  
 
SSDI= β0+ β1MA+ β2T2+ β3MA·T2+ δ*X + u (4)                                                                               
Spouse w/o ESI = β0+ β1MA+ β2T2+ β3MA·T2+ δ*X + u (5) 
 
The dummy variable, MA representing Massachusetts, captures possible differences between the 
treatment and control state which is a non-policy state. The coefficient of interest is now β3, the 
coefficient on the interaction term. The variable, T2·MA, is the same as a dummy variable equal 
to one for those observations in the treatment state in the second period. 
Table 2.3 demonstrates effects on the treatment state after health reform for the 
percentage of SSDI beneficiaries whose ages from 18 to 64 and the percentage of spouse without 
ESI. For the whole sample after health reform, panel A shows that the percentage change of 
SSDI beneficiaries increased by 0.48 percent to 0.59 percent while the percentage change of 
spouses without ESI increased by 0.84 percent to 3.16 percent. Additionally, these estimates are 
all significant at the 1 percent level. Next, for the married sample after health reform, panel B 
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shows that the percentage change of SSDI beneficiaries increased by 0.24 percent to 1.15 percent 
while the percentage change of spouses without ESI increased by 1.76 percent to 3.49 percent. 
As expected, the coefficients of interest are positive and significantly different from zero. I use 
three different numbers of control states to see if the results consistently show that these two 
groups increased significantly after health reform. 
 
4.3 Omitted factors 
The “differences-in-differences” identification strategy of Eq. (3) would be sufficient if there 
were no other Massachusetts-specific shocks and differential trends in SSDI beneficiaries’ rate 
between Massachusetts and other states. But it is difficult to control for these trends and shocks 
that are changing at the same time. Therefore, I extend the analysis by comparing the DD 
estimate on the potential SSDI applicants who are affected by ESI expansion to an analogous DD 
estimate on the potential SSDI applicants who are not affected by ESI expansion using a DDD 
framework.  
 
SSDI=α0+ α1MA+α2 (Spouse w/o ESI) +α3MA· (Spouse w/o ESI) + β0T2+ β1T2·MA+ 
β2T2· (Spouse w/o ESI) + β3T2·MA· (Spouse w/o ESI) + δ*X + u (6) 
 
In this “differences-in-differences-in-differences” model, the triple interaction term among T2, 
MA, and Spouse w/o ESI measures the specific effect of ESI expansion on those who are 
potential SSDI applicants in Massachusetts after health reform and β3 measures the causal impact 
of the health reform on the change of SSDI rolls. 
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Table 2.4 presents the results from estimating Eq. (6) for the full sample and the married 
sample respectively. It demonstrates estimates of the treatment group in the treatment state 
during the treatment period (after health reform) for the percentage of SSDI beneficiaries whose 
ages are from 18 to 64; it shows the percentage change of SSDI beneficiaries increased by 
between 1.14 percent to 1.37 percent, and these estimates are all significant at the 1 percent level. 
As expected, the coefficients of interest are positive and significantly different from zero. This 
specification better controls for Massachusetts-specific shocks and differential trends in SSDI 
beneficiaries’ rate between Massachusetts and other states because these estimates rely on this 
DDD model. 
 
4.4 Robustness checks 
I use a placebo test to estimate the effect of the reform as if it had occurred in other states or 
during another time. This test allows me to evaluate how likely it is to find a “false positive” 
when studying the Massachusetts health reform. If I were to find a significant effect even in 
states/time that had not enacted a major health care reform, it would signal that the effects 
estimated in Massachusetts may be spurious. I perform these placebo tests using the comparison 
states (New Jersey and Pennsylvania). In addition, I perform these placebo tests using false 
implement time of health reform, e.g. 2004 and 2005. Specifically, I use the following models to 
estimate: 
 
y= γ0+ γ1STATE+ γ2T2+ γ3STATE·T2+ u (7) 
y= γ0+ γ1MA+ γ2TIME+ γ3MA·TIME+ u (8) 
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The dummy variable, STATE representing the false treatment state, captures possible differences 
between the treatment and control states prior to the policy change. The coefficient of interest is 
now γ3, the coefficient on the interaction term, T2·STATE. On the other hand, the dummy variable, 
TIME representing the false treatment time, captures possible differences between the treatment 
and control period prior to the policy change. The coefficient of interest is now γ3, the coefficient 
on the interaction term, MA·TIME. 
Panel A of Table 2.5 shows that the false treatment state, New Jersey, doesn’t have a 
significant effect while Pennsylvania even has a negative significant effect which makes the 
main results even more credible. The absence of an effect in the placebo states provides some 
evidence that the results presented in the main text are due to the law in Massachusetts rather 
than a random fluctuation in SSDI beneficiaries’ rate. In panel B, I use two false treatment times 
to further check whether there is any health reform effect happening at during a fictitious time. 
The results show that either there is no effect or there is negative significant effect, which 
confirms the change of SSDI beneficiaries is mainly from Massachusetts health reform.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Congressional Budget Office, 2010 shows that a SSDI beneficiary had on average $10,500 in 
Medicare health costs, which is equivalent to more than 80 percent of the average yearly SSDI 
cash benefit in 2009. Therefore, the Medicare coverage is particularly valuable to these disabled 
individuals. Thus, the 2006 Massachusetts health reform is likely to influence the application 
rates for SSDI benefits, but whether it will result in more or fewer beneficiaries is unclear.  
This paper finds that the positive effect of the ESI expansion on SSDI participation is 
0.98 percentage points stronger for spouses without ESI than it is for spouses with ESI. These 
56 
 
 
 
estimates imply spouses without ESI are associated with higher SSDI beneficiaries which 
accounts for a 10.7 percentage point increase in SSDI beneficiaries in Massachusetts after the 
reform. Moreover, the estimates imply an elasticity of spouses without ESI with respect to SSDI 
beneficiaries of 0.0913. The calculations also suggest that the health reform was more expensive 
than it might first appear because of an increase in SSDI expenditure. 
From a policy point of view this study is interesting. Providing the health insurance 
coverage to individuals creates stopgap forms of health coverage for potential SSDI beneficiaries. 
Those with an alternative source of coverage are more likely to apply to the program than those 
without such an alternative. These findings have several important welfare implications. First, 
they suggest that providing insurance coverage to potential SSDI applicants will not reduce 
uninsured people too much in the U.S. Indeed, it would only substitute private health insurance 
with public health insurance.  
Second, providing insurance during the waiting period may encourage potential 
applicants to apply for SSDI. However, these increased applications are difficult to assess the 
welfare implications. Gruber and Kubik (2002) provide a detailed discussion about welfare 
implications regarding how health insurance affects different disabled applicants. For example, if 
the additional applications are from the least disabled applicants, then it might suggest little 
inefficiency in health reform expenditure; however, if the increased applications are from the 
most disabled applicants, then it could lead to significant welfare gains by helping disabled 
applicants who cannot bear the risk of going without coverage for any period of time. Future 
work could assess the underlying disability status of those SSDI applicants to improve our ability 
to explain and manage the increasing costs of the SSDI programs in terms of new beneficiaries 
and the size of future caseloads.  
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Appendix for Chapter 2. 
SSA population data and disabled beneficiaries ages 18-64 
Calendar year Source 
2003 Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, 2003 Table 8. 
2004 Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, 2004 Table 8. 
2005 Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, 2005 Table 8. 
2006 Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, 2006 Table 8. 
2007 Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, 2007 Table 8. 
2008 Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, 2008 Table 8. 
2009 Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, 2009 Table 8. 
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Table 2.1 Summary statistics 
SSDI rolls (weighted) 
Variable Treatment period (08-09) Control period (03-05) 
  USA   MA     USA   MA   
Mean 1.42% 3.33% 1.37% 2.44% 
Age 54.84 (12.46) 52.59 (11.86) 54.65 (11.9) 52.48 (10.51) 
Female (%) 47.67 (49.94) 48.38 (50.01) 51.4 (49.98) 59.87 (49.04) 
Nonwhite (%) 25 (43.3) 16.12 (36.81) 26 (43.88) 11.02 (31.34) 
Education 39.2 (3.1) 39.01 (2.99) 38.86 (3.13) 39.03 (3.62) 
Married 40.23 (49.03) 18.27 (38.68) 41.11 (49.2) 23 (42.1) 
n 15,557   558     34,944 952 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; MA=Massachusetts. 
Source: 2004 Full Panel and 2008 wave1-10 of Survey of Income and Program Participation 
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Table 2.2 Estimates within Massachusetts (MA) 
Pre vs. Post within MA weighted (03-05 vs. 08-09) 
Panel A: Full sample 
SSDI 
SIPP SSA 
weighted un-weighted 
Health reform effect 0.0056*** 0.0058*** 0.0035*** 0.004*** 0.0055*** 
Robust S.E [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.00099] 
Control covariates No Yes No Yes 
Observations 101,182 101,182 5 
Panel B: Married sample 
SSDI Spouse w/o ESI Elasticity 
weighted weighted 
Health reform effect 0.0042*** 0.004*** 0.04793*** 0.0438*** 0.0913 
Robust S.E [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0052] [0.0049] 
Control covariates No Yes No Yes 
Observations 39,036 39,036   
Panel C: Married sample 
DD within MA 
SSDI rolls (Logit) 
ME ME 
Health reform effect 1.6001*** 0.0087*** 1.6213*** 0.0098*** 
Robust S.E [0.4477] (0.0018) [0.448] (0.0022) 
Control covariates No Yes 
Observations 39,036   39,036 
 
Notes: 1. robust standard errors in square brackets. ME: Marginal effect based on Ai and Norton, 2003. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test. 
**   Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test. 
*     Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test. 
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Table 2.3 Difference-in-Difference estimates between Massachusetts and neighboring states 
DD (weighted) (03-05 vs. 08-09) 
SSDI rolls Spouse w/o ESI 
Panel A: Full sample 
6 control states 
n=432,532 n=432,532 
0 .0051*** (0.0009) 0.0261*** (0.0027) 
4 control states 
n=188,162 n=188,162 
0 .0059*** (0.0011) 0 .0084*** (0.0034) 
2 control states 
n=345,552 n=345,552 
    0.0048*** (0.001) 0.0316*** (0.0028) 
Panel B: Married sample 
6 control states 
n=169,630 n=169,630 
0.0024* (0.0015) 0.0303*** (0.0063) 
4 control states 
n=73,834 n=73,834 
0 .0115*** (0.0015) 0 .0176** (0.0077) 
2 control states 
n=134,832 n=134,832 
    0.00007 (0.0016) 0.0349*** (0.0065) 
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
6 control states=NH, VT, RI, CT, NJ, and PA 
4 control states=NH, VT, RI, and CT 
2 control states= NJ, and PA 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test. 
**   Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test. 
*     Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test. 
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Table 2.4 Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference estimates 
DDD (weighted) (03-05 vs. 08-09) 
SSDI rolls 
Full sample Married sample 
6 control states 
n=432,532 n=169,630 
0.0129*** [0.002] 0.0113*** [0.0025] 
4 control states 
n=188,162 n=73,834 
0.0077*** [0.0035] 0.005 [0.0033] 
2 control states 
n=345,552 n=134,832 
    0.0147*** [0.0022] 0.0136*** [0.0028] 
Notes: 1.Robust standard errors in square brackets. 
6 control states=NH, VT, RI, CT, NJ, and PA 
4 control states=NH, VT, RI, and CT 
2 control states= NJ, and PA 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test. 
**   Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test. 
*     Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test. 
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Table 2.5 Robustness checks 
Panel A: False treatment state 
DD within 
SSDI (Logit) 
New Jersey ME Pennsylvania ME 
Health reform effect 0.1472 -0.0008 -0.4102** -0.0057** 
Robust S.E [0.1782] (0.0027) [0.1807] (0.0028) 
Control covariates Yes Yes 
Observations 48,496 47,300 
Panel B: False treatment time 
Pre vs. Post within MA (weighted ) 
SSDI 
(03-04 vs. 05-09) (03 vs. 04-09) 
Health reform effect -0.0005 -0.00067 -0.0088*** -0.0092*** 
Robust S.E [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0021] [0.0029] 
Control covariates No Yes No Yes 
Observations 39,036 39,036 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors in square brackets. ME: Marginal effect based on Ai and Norton, 2003. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test. 
**   Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test. 
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Table 2.A1 SSDI rolls aged 18-64 form SSA 
Massachusetts 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Beneficiaries 157,173 163,210 169514 174,940 180,907 188,327 196,040 
Resident population 4,089,322 4,097,973 4,087,881 4,132,347 4,157,960 4,199,836 4,266,071 
  3.84% 3.98% 4.15% 4.23% 4.35% 4.48% 4.60% 
Source: SSA administrative data 
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CHAPTER 3. How Did the Massachusetts Health Reform Affect the SSI-disabled Program? 
 
1. Introduction 
In the U.S., the public health insurance is particularly important to the people who have 
difficulties purchasing private health insurance coverage. Usually, the public health insurance is 
closely tied to the eligibility for the federal disability programs such as Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). For example, SSDI beneficiaries 
receive Medicare while SSI beneficiaries receive Medicaid. These programs require a rigorous 
screening process for disability and the applicants usually need to show that they are physically 
incapable of finding suitable jobs. Therefore, the recipients typically choose to withdraw from 
the labor force in order to obtain the public health insurance coverage. These scenarios may lead 
to potential employment disincentives for working-age people with disabilities. 
However, after the 2006 Massachusetts health reform, the public health insurance 
expansion creates significant employment incentives for potential SSI applicants. Several 
observations support the idea that expanding insurance coverage will reduce welfare program 
participation. First, the fully phased-in Medicaid reforms increased the probability of working in 
the labor force by 0.9 percentage points and Medicaid expansion reduced the probability of Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program participation by 1.2 percentage points 
(Yelowitz, 1995). Second, the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB) program reduced SSI 
participation for the elderly (Yelowitz, 2000). Third, the Medicaid buy-in can break or weaken 
the link between health insurance and SSI eligibility for people with disabilities (Goodman et al., 
2007) and, particularly in Massachusetts where the percentage of buy-in program enrollees 
working above substantial gainful activity is more than 60 percent (Hanes and Folkman, 2003). 
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Expanding insurance coverage could reduce SSI-disabled applicants’ incentive by providing 
Medicaid and by maintaining their current jobs without withdrawing from the labor force. 
There is a voluminous amount of literature to support the argument that expanding 
publicly subsidized health insurance leads to reduced welfare participation. However, there is 
little evidence about how insurance influences the SSI-disabled program participation and, more 
specifically, whether initial SSI-disability claims are affected. This is an important shortcoming 
in the literature because part of the support for expanding publicly subsidized health insurance 
comes from the belief that it will be de-linking health insurance and SSI eligibility.  
I estimate the causal effect of the reform on SSI application decisions using three 
administrative data sources (Social Security Administration, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services and U.S. Cancer Statistics) and one national survey database, March Current Population 
Survey. Collecting data from these sources allow me to investigate the change before and after 
the implementation of health reform on the caseload of initial claims of SSI-disabled claimants, 
Medicaid recipients, cancer incidence counts and SSI-disabled beneficiaries.  
I evaluate the effect of the Medicaid expansion on the change of initial SSI claim rate 
using the near-universal expansion of health insurance coverage in Massachusetts. In 2006, 
Massachusetts simultaneously mandated that all state residents must have insurance (or lose a 
personal income tax exemption with additional monthly penalties) and dramatically increased 
free and subsidized insurance for low- and middle-income residents. I perform a behavioral 
analysis that exploits the variation in the intensity of the impact of the reform across SSI-
disabled applicants.  
Potential SSI-disabled applicants who are affected by the Medicaid expansion will have 
much less incentive to move onto SSI rolls than their counterparts who are not affected by the 
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Medicaid expansion. Additionally, I compare potential SSI-disabled applicants in Massachusetts 
to similar counterparts in the neighboring states that do not implement health reform. Exploiting 
the variation in treatment intensity allows me to identify how expanding public insurance 
coverage affected the initial SSI claim rate in a way that is robust to Massachusetts-specific time 
trends. 
I have several findings. I find that the health reform reduced the initial SSI claim rate by 
0.098 percent (equivalent to 11.66 percent of total claims in 2008 Massachusetts). The result 
suggests that the initial SSI claim rate is quite sensitive to insurance status. These results also 
show that Medicaid-disabled expenditure can be saved around 1 percent and suggest 
inefficiencies in Medicaid-disabled expenditure in Massachusetts. However, spending $1 on the 
Medicaid-disabled could save $0.016 for individuals who get into SSI for the first time and 
$0.032 for individuals who receive SSI for multiple spells.  
These findings have consequences for the cost of health care reform. Expanding 
eligibility for Medicaid could result in reduced expenditures for the current SSI program by 
giving potential disabled applicants less incentive to apply for SSI. Reducing caseloads could 
reduce current SSI expenditures and increase taxable revenue due to an increase in work hours. If 
Medicaid is an important determinant of the volume of SSI applications, then offering health 
insurance without participating in SSI may reduce total cost. This could happen when disabled 
adults are willing to forgo the cash benefits from SSI. 
The rest of the paper is laid out in five sections. Section 2 gives an overview of the SSI 
program in the US and the Medicaid expansion in Massachusetts. This is followed by Section 3, 
which discusses the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results for the impact of 
68 
 
 
 
health reform on public insurance coverage, while Section 5 shows the results for the impact of 
health reform on SSI participation decisions. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Supplemental security income, Medicaid expansion, and the 2006 Massachusetts reform 
For the purposes of SSI eligibility, disabled individuals are those ‘unable to engage in any 
substantial gainful activity (SGA) because of a medically determined physical or mental 
impairment expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to last, for a 
continuous period of at least 12 months.’ Eligibility for benefits is determined on a monthly basis. 
SSI recipients are required to have their nonmedical eligibility factors reviewed periodically (e.g. 
every 1 to 6 years), depending on their situation. In addition to the nonmedical reviews, medical 
reviews are conducted on disabled recipients to determine whether or not they continue to be 
disabled, and are performed most frequently on disabled recipients whose medical conditions are 
considered likely to improve. Medical reviews are required for disabled recipients when earnings 
of recipients exceed the SGA level. 
As for Medicaid eligibility, certain qualifications must be met regarding age, whether 
applicants are pregnant or disabled; applicants’ income and resources; and whether applicants are 
U.S. citizens or lawfully admitted immigrants. The rules for calculating applicants’ income and 
resources vary from state to state and from group to group. Assets and resources are also tested 
against established thresholds. Categorically needy persons who are eligible for Medicaid may or 
may not also receive cash assistance from the SSI program. Because of excessive medical 
expenses, medically needy persons who would be categorically eligible except for income or 
assets may become eligible for Medicaid. 
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Due to health reform in Massachusetts, individuals eligible under the Medicaid 
Demonstration program can have access to health care services through several pathways. The 
mandatory and optional Medicaid State plan populations determine their eligibility by reviewing 
the applicable Medicaid laws and regulations. State plan eligibilities are included in the Medicaid 
Demonstration program in order to generate savings to provide benefits to expansion populations. 
Table 3.1 lists all SSI potential qualifiers for applicants ages 19 to 64 who might get Medicaid 
via MassHealth without applying for SSI under the pre- and post-reform guidelines (the 
MassHealth Medicaid Demonstration defines 18-year-olds as children). These groups in Table 
3.1 can increase their earning level without losing public insurance and avoid the wait involved 
in a SSI application if they value Medicaid more than cash assistance. 
 
3. Data and empirical strategy 
3.1 Data 
First, Social Security Administration (SSA) refers to the first filing as an “initial claim” when a 
state agency first reviews a claim for disability benefits. For the initial claim rate of SSI from 
SSA, this dataset only includes disability claims sent to a state agency for determining disability 
criteria.  Disability claims that do not meet the non-disability criteria are normally denied 
without being sent to a state agency.  If SSA determines that non-disability criteria were not met 
while a claim is pending in a state agency, then claims pending in a state agency will be returned 
to SSA without a determination.  
Second, SSA refers to simultaneous as a “concurrent claim” filing when the same person 
files a SSI claim and a Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) disability claim. When an 
applicant applies for both SSI and SSDI benefits, that claim is normally counted only once 
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because both types of claims are processed together. The division of claims between SSI and 
concurrent claims can provide the socioeconomic backgrounds of applicants. SSI applicants do 
not have a recent work history, and have little or no income and resources. Concurrent applicants 
have a recent work history, but also have scant income and resources. Claims filing analysis can 
be accomplished by comparing concurrent cases, SSI cases, and aggregate SSI cases.   
Third, U.S. Cancer Statistics (USCS) is the official federal collection of statistics on 
cancer incidence from registries with high-quality data for the United States. Incidence data are 
provided by The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Program of Cancer 
Registries. Cancer incidence data are available for the United States and individual states by age 
group, race, gender, childhood cancer classifications, and cancer site for the years 1999 to 2008. 
Fourth, Current Population Survey (CPS) is a nationally representative household survey 
of the US civilian, noninstitutionalized population, collecting monthly information on labor 
market characteristics. In addition to those data, the CPS includes an Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement (ASEC), conducted mostly in March, which collects detailed information 
on income and health insurance coverage. With an annual sample size of about 60,000 
households, the CPS ASEC provides relatively large samples for many states, including 
Massachusetts. However, given the focus on a small group of the population, the sample size for 
this analysis is relatively small. 
 
3.2 Empirical strategy 
This analysis takes advantage of the “natural experiment” that occurred in Massachusetts to 
compare the change in the initial claim rate of SSI-disabled applicants ages 18 to 64 before and 
after the state implemented its health reform initiative, while using Difference-in-Difference (DD) 
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and Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference (DDD) methods. The estimation approach exploits 
variation over time (comparing pre-and post-reform time periods), across population groups 
(comparing SSI-disabled applicants who are affected by Medicaid expansion to SSI-disabled 
applicants who are not affected by Medicaid expansion), and across states (comparing 
Massachusetts to comparison states in the Northeast that did not implement health reform). 
This paper relies on three administrative data sets from 2003 to 2008 for the caseload of 
initial claims of SSI-disabled claimants from SSA, Medicaid recipients from Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and cancer incidence counts from USCS combined with 
population data from the Census Bureau (CB) to construct panel data and one national survey 
database, March CPS. I rely on data for 2004-2008 from 2005-2009 CPS.  
Defining the SSI Beneficiaries-Disabled Status14—CPS respondents are asked in March to 
report the reason why they received SSI benefits over the prior calendar year. In the CPS, 
individuals are classified as SSI-disabled beneficiaries only if they report having SSI benefits at 
any point over the prior calendar year because they were disabled. However, the SSI-disabled 
beneficiary rate in the CPS aligns more closely to point-in-time estimates than full-year estimates.  
Defining the Pre-and Post-Reform Periods—Since these datasets were calculated based 
on “Calendar year,” I am limited in my ability to align the pre-and post-reform periods with the 
exact timing of reform implementation. Therefore, I define the pre-and post-reform periods 
based on the year, rather than the month, that Massachusetts implemented reform. Even though 
some of the initial reform efforts went into effect in October 2006, my post-reform period using 
the SSA, USCS, CMS, and CPS begins in 2007. After defining the pre-and post-reform periods, I 
                                                 
14 The question reads, “What were the reasons (you/name) (Was/were) getting supplemental security income last year?” The five 
coded responses are: “Disabled (adult or child),” “Blind (adult or child),” “On behalf of a disabled child,” “On behalf of a blind 
child,” “Other (adult or child),” For disabled beneficiaries, I restrict the attention on Disabled (adult or child). 
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then compared the initial claim rate of SSI-disabled applicants, incidence rate of cancer patients, 
percentage of Medicaid recipients, and SSI-disabled beneficiaries in the post-reform period of 
2007–2008 to those applicants, patients, recipients, and beneficiaries in the pre-reform period of 
2003–2004.   
Defining the Comparison States—The comparison states provide an estimate of what 
would have happened in Massachusetts in the absence of health reform. Identifying an 
appropriate comparison state is difficult given the wide variation in state policies, programs and 
populations, and the frequency with which other states were also implementing program and 
policy changes that affected SSI-disabled applicants over the study period. In this paper, I rely on 
four states in the New England division (1.New Hampshire, 2.Vermont, 3.Rhode Island, 
4.Connecticut) and two states in the Middle Atlantic division (5.New Jersey, 6.Pennsylvania) in 
the Northeast region as the comparison states.  
Defining the Comparison Group—The comparison group provides an estimate of what 
would have happened in the absence of the Medicaid expansion within Massachusetts. Potential 
control groups include SSI-Disabled Children (SSI-DC) and people who have been diagnosed 
with cancer. Due to comprehensive Medicaid expansion for children in Massachusetts, I will not 
use SSI-DC as the control group because SSI-DC might be affected significantly. To focus more 
on adults instead, I decide to use cancer patients ages 20 to 64 (USCS divides age categories into 
5-year blocks, so 20-24 is the youngest data block which only covers adults). Since the age range 
between the control group and the treatment group is similar, these two groups should be more 
comparable. The control group includes all genders, all ethnicities, all races, and all types of 
cancer.  
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To estimate the overall impact of health reform on SSI-disabled applicants, using a DD 
framework I compared the change in the initial claim rate of SSI-disabled claimants in 
Massachusetts to the change in the initial claim rate for a similar group in a comparison state 
before and after the reform. The comparison states control for underlying trends in the initial 
claim rate of SSI-disabled unrelated to health reform. Furthermore, I extend the analysis by 
comparing the DD estimate on the potential SSI-disabled applicants who are affected by 
Medicaid expansion to an analogous DD estimate on the potential SSI-disabled applicants who 
are not affected by the Medicaid expansion using a DDD framework. 
 
3.2.1 DDD estimate 
I will label the two time periods as one and two, let MA represent the state implementing the 
policy, and let Medicaid denote the potential SSI-disabled applicants who are affected by 
Medicaid expansion. The coefficient of interest is now π3, the coefficient on the triple interaction 
term, T2·MA·Medicaid. 
 
y= α0+ α1MA+ α2Medicaid+ α3MA·Medicaid + π0T2+ π1T2·MA+ π2T2·Medicaid + 
π3T2·MA·Medicaid+u (1) 
 
where y is the outcome of interest. The dummy variable, Medicaid, captures possible differences 
between the treatment and control group. The time period dummy, T2, captures aggregate factors 
that would cause changes in y even in the absence of a policy change. The dummy variable, MA, 
captures possible differences between the treatment and control state, which is non-policy state. 
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3.2.2 DD estimate across states 
If I drop the Medicaid terms from Eq. (1), I will obtain the DD estimate described in the 
following: 
 
y= β0+ β1MA+ β2T2+ β3MA·T2+ u (2)                                                                                                                    
 
The coefficient of interest is now β3, the coefficient on the interaction term, T2·MA, which is the 
same as a dummy variable equal to one for those observations in the treatment state in the second 
period. 
 
3.2.3 DD estimate within Massachusetts 
On the other hand, if I drop the MA terms from Eq. (1), I will get another DD estimate displayed 
in the following: 
 
y= δ0+ δ1Medicaid+ δ2T2+ δ3Medicaid·T2+ u (3)                                                                                            
 
The coefficient of interest is now δ3, the coefficient on the interaction term, Medicaid·T2, which 
is the same as a dummy variable equal to one for those observations in the treatment group in the 
second period. 
 
4. The impact of the 2006 health reform on public insurance coverage 
Table 3.2 presents the percentage of Medicaid recipients across states and years. The percentages 
of all states rise gradually by year, except Massachusetts, which increase by 7.82 percent from 
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2003 to 2008. By constructing panel data with this information and running regression analysis, I 
further investigate the percentage change of Medicaid recipients in the treatment state in a 
regression framework using Eq. (2), and expect to see positive significant coefficients because 
more intensive health reform can be anticipated to raise incentives to get Medicaid since state 
governments are expanding eligibility and providing premium subsidies to potential applicants.  
Table 3.4 demonstrates estimates of the interaction term between the “treatment state” 
and “after health reform” for the percentage of Medicaid recipients for all adults. As expected, in 
column 2, the coefficients of interest are positive and significantly different from zero.  
 
5. The impact of the 2006 health reform on initial SSI claim rate 
5.1 The effect of Medicaid expansion on SSI-disabled claimants 
Table 3.3 lists the caseload of initial claims for SSI-disabled and resident populations ages 18 to 
64. Then I calculate the initial claim rate by dividing the caseloads by the corresponding 
population. In Table 3.3, only the percentage for Massachusetts decreases by 0.13 percent from 
2003 to 2008. One potential explanation is that from 2005 to 2008, the economy was booming 
which might make the potential SSI-disabled applicants not apply due to higher opportunity cost. 
Therefore, I use the DD estimate across states to eliminate the business cycle factor between 
states and reveal the effect of health reform on SSI-disabled applicants. 
Next, with the initial claim rate across states and years, I can construct panel data and 
proceed to assess the behavior of SSI-disabled applicants in the treatment state in a regression 
framework using Eq. (2). Table 3.4 shows estimates of the interaction term between the 
“treatment state” and “after health reform” for the initial claim rate of SSI-disabled applicants 
ages 18 to 64. In column 1, surprisingly, for initial claim rate of SSI-disabled applicants, the 
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coefficient of interest is negative and significantly different from zero. These findings suggest 
that potential SSI-disabled applicants ages 18 to 64 might have significantly less incentive to 
apply for SSI after health reform.  
In the SSI program, reasons for applying for SSI might be to gain access to cash 
assistance and Medicaid. Therefore, scenarios explaining the significant caseload decline include 
the following possibilities. First, if potential disabled applicants have relatively higher incomes, 
they may not have enough incentive to apply because the cash assistance does not attract them. 
Second, these applicants may only need Medicaid without cash benefits because they value 
health insurance more. During the reform, Massachusetts expanded Medicaid income eligibility 
comprehensively and provided premium subsidies to both qualifying small employers and their 
low-income employees for the purchase of private health insurance. Thus, these applicants might 
have less incentive to apply for SSI because they can get Medicaid easily without participating in 
SSI.  
 
5.2 March Current Population Survey results 
After using DD and DDD estimators to confirm the hypotheses via information from the 
administrative database, I apply CPS-ASEC to assess the behavior of SSI-disabled beneficiaries 
ages 18 to 64 in the treatment state in a regression framework using Eq. (2). I expect to see that 
the coefficients should be negative because the caseload of initial claims of SSI-disabled 
applicants dropped significantly, which might make the number of SSI-disabled beneficiaries 
decrease. These results suggest that more intensive health reform might have led individuals to 
have less incentive to apply for SSI. Table 3.4 presents estimates of the interaction term between 
the “treatment state” and “after health reform” for the SSI-disabled beneficiaries. As expected, in 
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column 3, SSI-disabled beneficiaries, the coefficients of interest are negative and significantly 
different from zero.  
 
5.3 Labor force participation for low skill workers 
Since Massachusetts implemented near-universal health reform, especially the expansion 
of Medicaid income eligibility, I expected to see that the rate of labor force participation for low 
skill workers increase, and potential SSI-disabled applicants have less incentive to apply for SSI, 
which was confirmed by the results in Table 3.4. Next, Table 3.5 confirms that the labor force 
participation of low skill workers in Massachusetts increased.  
For example, in the Northeast region, Massachusetts is the only state in which both the 
number of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) participants with work 
requirements and the number of TANF participants who met work requirements increased 
significantly from 19 percent in FY2007 to 45.1 percent in FY2008, which is much higher than 
the national average (29.8 percent in FY 2008). Moreover, the results indicate that the Deficit 
Reduction Act (DRA)’s reauthorized TANF with changes in the work requirement in 2007 may 
not be the main reason for the increased labor force participation of low-income families. Both 
the number of TANF participants with work requirements and the number of TANF participants 
who met work requirements in other neighboring states decreased significantly except in Rhode 
Island, where the number of TANF participants with work requirements increased slightly. 
 
5.4 Within Massachusetts analysis 
Next, I want to further investigate the effect of Medicaid expansion on SSI-disabled applicants 
by using the control group to see if the Medicaid expansion made the caseload of SSI-disabled 
78 
 
 
 
applicants drop. This group could be the potential SSI-disabled applicants and this group is not 
affected by the Medicaid expansion, which means that the percentage of this group should not 
grow significantly. 
In Table 3.6, I use the incidence counts divided by the approximate population ages 18 to 
64 to get the incidence rate across states and years. Due to a lack of data in USCS, I was unable 
to get the data for Vermont for ages between 25-29 in 2005 and 2006, and 20-24 in 2004. 
Connecticut was not included in the national data. 
Therefore, in order to estimate the impact of the Medicaid expansion in Massachusetts, I 
investigate the behavior of SSI-disabled applicants in the treatment group in a regression 
framework using Eq. (3). Thus, I compare changes over time in initial claim rates of SSI-
disabled applicants ages 18 to 64 to changes over time in incidence rate of cancer in patients ages 
20 to 64. I expect to see negative significant coefficients because a more intensive Medicaid 
expansion might have led potential SSI-disabled applicants who are affected by Medicaid to 
have much less incentive to move onto SSI rolls. Table 3.7 presents estimates of the interaction 
term between the “treatment group” and “after health reform” for the initial claim rate of SSI-
disabled applicants ages 18 to 64. As expected, the coefficients of interest are negative and 
significantly different from zero. This coefficient shows that the total claims were reduced by 
11.66 percent.15 This table also shows that Medicaid-disabled expenditure can be saved up to 
$37.45 million, which is 0.82 percent and suggests inefficiencies in the Medicaid-disabled 
expenditure in Massachusetts.16 However, spending $1 on the Medicaid-disabled could save 
$0.016 for individuals who get into SSI for the first time and $0.032 for individuals who receive 
                                                 
15 (0.00098/0.0084)*100%=11.66% 
16 $9,100*0.098%*4.2M=37.45M; Medicaid Payments per Enrollee-Disabled in Massachusetts:9,100, FY 2008 available online 
at http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?ind=183&cat=4&rgn=23&cmprgn=1; $37.45M/$4,571M=0.82%; Medicaid 
Payments of Disabled group in Massachusetts: $4,571 Million, FY 2008 available online at 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?cmprgn=1&cat=4&rgn=23&ind=858&sub=47 
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SSI for multiple spells (See appendix A for description of calculation).17 This indicates that it 
results in saving but that is not much in the grand scheme of government expenditures. The net 
cost of between Medicaid-disabled program and SSI-disabled program would be 4494.06 Million 
(4,571-76.94). 
Furthermore, I want to confirm the results of Table 3.7 by looking at what happens to 
SSI-disabled applicants who are affected by the Medicaid expansion in the treatment state after 
health reform via a regression framework using Eq. (1). I expect to see that the coefficients 
should be negative. These results will confirm that following the health reform in the treatment 
state and in the treatment group, potential SSI-disabled applicants ages 18 to 64 might have less 
incentive to apply for SSI. Column 2 of Table 3.7 presents estimates of the triple interaction term 
among “treatment state”, “treatment group”, and “after health reform” for the initial claim rate of 
SSI-disabled applicants ages 18 to 64. As expected, the coefficient of interest is negative.  
 
5.5 Robustness checks 
As a placebo test, I estimate the effect of the reform as if it had occurred in other states. This test 
allows me to evaluate how likely it is to find a “false positive” when studying the Massachusetts 
reform. If I were to find a significant effect even in states that had not enacted a major health 
care reform, it would signal that the effects estimated in Massachusetts might be spurious. I 
perform these placebo tests using the SSA and CMS from the comparison states of New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Specifically, I 
estimate 
 
                                                 
17 $7,528*0.098%*45.15%*5.5*4.2M=76.94M; 76.94/4,571=0.0168; $7,528*0.098%*45.15%*10.5*4.2M=146.89M; 
146.89/4,571=0.0321 
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y= γ0+ γ1STATE+ γ2T2+ γ3STATE·T2+ u  (4) 
 
The dummy variable, STATE, captures possible differences between the treatment and control 
states prior to the policy change. The coefficient of interest is now γ3, the coefficient on the 
interaction term, T2·STATE.  
Table 8 presents the results. I find a significant reduction in initial SSI claim rate as a 
result of the reform in Massachusetts. However, in all other states I do not find a negative 
statistically significant effect. The absence of an effect in the placebo states provides some 
evidence that the results presented in the main text are due to the law in Massachusetts rather 
than a random fluctuation in initial SSI claim rate. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper is among the first to analyze how insurance induces people to substitute between 
Medicaid and SSI-disabled program. I study the 2006 Massachusetts health insurance reform to 
evaluate the impact of insurance on the initial SSI claim rate. In 2006, Massachusetts introduced 
legislation requiring that all state residents have health insurance coverage. I compare changes in 
the initial SSI claim rate both across potential SSI-disabled applicants in Massachusetts and 
between Massachusetts and other states to identify the causal effect of the law. The effect of the 
law on insurance coverage makes the initial SSI claim rate decreases significantly. 
A one-percentage point increase in the public health insurance predicts a 0.028 
percentage point reduction in initial SSI claim rate.18 My estimate implies that the law reduced 
the initial SSI claim rate by 0.098 percent. The result suggests that initial SSI claim rate is quite 
sensitive to insurance status. Furthermore, I find that the reform could result in reduced 
                                                 
18 From column 1 of Table 4, 0.157/5.62=0.028 
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expenditure for the current SSI program by encouraging potential disabled applicants not to 
move onto SSI rolls. The reduction in caseload could reduce current SSI expenditures and means 
that low skill workers are increasing hours of work. However, the Medicaid-only program might 
provide another incentive for some disabled adults who were not previously participating in SSI 
because of the stigma associated with the program. In this scenario, it could increase costs 
(Yelowitz, 1998). This might already be happening through the Medically Needy (MN) program, 
which in Massachusetts does not have an income limit for noninstitutionalized people with 
disabilities (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2003). Since the MN program has fewer covered services 
under Medicaid than for categorically needy recipients, it may not provide enough incentive for 
the disabled not to apply for SSI. 
Finally, these results also show on one hand, that Medicaid-disabled expenditure can be 
saved up to $37.45 million, which is 0.82 percent and suggest inefficiencies in Medicaid-
disabled expenditure in Massachusetts. However, spending $1 on the Medicaid-disabled could 
save $0.016 for individuals who get into SSI for the first time and $0.032 for individuals who 
receive SSI for multiple spells. Under current budget pressures, the Medicaid expansions and 
subsidies to purchase coverage mandated by the new Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
the federal government may improve the ability to manage the costs of the Medicaid and SSI 
programs in the future. 
This project also speaks to the larger issue of the impact of insurance on welfare program 
participation. While much literature has shown that insurance coverage decreases the 
participation of welfare program (e.g., AFDC; SSI-aged) generally, this study provides direct 
evidence that public insurance expansion may also lead potential SSI-disabled applicants to 
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increase their earning level without losing Medicaid and saving the waiting time involved in a 
SSI application process.  
Measuring the causal impact of insurance is notoriously difficult because it requires 
finding exogenous sources of variation in insurance status. The natural experiment in this paper 
is a particularly relevant source of credible exogenous variation to study because it represents the 
same type of insurance expansion program that recently occurred at the federal level with the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. By analyzing the impact of the Massachusetts health 
reform on the initial SSI claim rate, this research contributes to the ongoing debate about the role 
of health insurance subsidies and individual mandates in public policy. 
 
Appendix for chapter 3 
A. Saving on SSI expenditure calculation 
Saving on SSI expenditure for considering only first spell = (Reduced initial claim 
rate)*(Average allowance rate)*(Average SSI payment)*(Mean length of all first 
spell)*(Massachusetts resident population). Furthermore, Saving on SSI expenditure for 
considering all spells = (Reduced initial claim rate)*(Average Allowance rate)*(Average SSI 
payment)*(Mean length of all spells) *(Massachusetts resident population). Rupp and Scott 
(1995) show that mean length of all first SSI spells is 5.5 years; while multiple spells are 
accounted for, the projected mean total pre-retirement age SSI disability stay almost doubles to 
10.5 years for all awardees. SSI Annual Statistical Report (2008) shows that total SSI payment 
for the disabled in 2008 is 37,245,543,000 and total recipients for ages 18-64 in 2008 are 
4,947,475. Thus, I calculate average SSI payment per awardee is (37,245,543,000/4,947,475) = 
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7,528. As for the allowance rate of SSI initial claim, it is 45.15 percent after taking average on all 
seven states. 
 
B. Data source 
B.1. Population data ages 18-64 
Calendar year Source 
2003 Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, 2003 pp. 144-145. 
2004 Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, 2004 pp. 139-140. 
2005 Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, 2005 pp. 149-150. 
2006 Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, 2006 pp. 153-154. 
2007 Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, 2007 pp. 155-156. 
2008 Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance 
Program, 2008 pp. 155-156. 
 
B.2. Population data  
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division. 2011. Table 1. Preliminary Annual Estimates of the 
Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to 
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July 1, 2010 (NST-PEST2010-01). Available at www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-
PEST2010-01.xls 
 
B.3. SSI-disabled caseload data  
Social Security Administration (SSA), Office of Retirement and Disability Policy (ORDP), 
Office of Disability Programs (ODP), “SSA State Agency Monthly Workload Data.” Baltimore, 
Maryland. Available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/disability/data/SSA-SA-MOWL.xls 
 
B.4. Medicaid data 
Annual Statistical Supplement, various years. Available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/ 
Massachusetts Medicaid Statistics, various years. Available at 
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-State/Massachusetts.html 
 
References for chapter 3 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services Office of 
Medicaid. 2008. MassHealth Medicaid Section 1115 Demonstration. Centers For Medicare 
& Medicaid Services Special Terms and Conditions 
Goodman, N. J., Stapleton, D.C., Livermore, G. A., & ODay, B., 2007. The health care financing 
maze for working-age people with disabilities. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Institute for 
Policy Research  
Hanes, Pamela and Jessica Folkman. 2003. State Medicaid Options that Support the Employment 
of Workers with Disabilities. Resource Paper, Center for Health Care Strategies.  
85 
 
 
 
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2003. Medicaid medically needy programs: 
an important source of Medicaid coverage. Washington, DC  
National Program of Cancer Registries: 1999 - 2008 Incidence, WONDER On-line Database. 
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention and National Cancer Institute; 2011. Accessed at 
http://wonder.cdc.gov/cancernpcr-v2008.html 
Social Security Administration, 2003-2008. Annual statistical supplement, 2003-2008. 
Washington, DC 
Social Security Administration, 2003-2008. Annual statistical report on the social security 
disability insurance program, 2003 to 2008. Washington, DC 
Social Security Administration, Office of Retirement and Disability Policy, Office of Disability 
Programs, “SSA state agency monthly workload data.” Baltimore, Maryland. 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/disability/data/ssa-sa-mowl.htm  
U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division. 2011. Table 1. Preliminary annual estimates of the 
resident population for the United States, regions, states, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to 
July 1, 2010 (NST-PEST2010-01) 
U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2010. TANF: implications of recent legislative and 
economic changes for state programs and work participation rates. Report GAO-10-525. 
Yelowitz, Aaron S., 1995. The Medicaid notch, labor supply, and welfare participation: evidence 
from eligibility expansions. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (4), 909-939. 
Yelowitz, Aaron S., 1998. Why did the SSI-disabled program grow so much? disentangling the 
effect of Medicaid. Journal of Health Economics 17 (3), 321-349. 
86 
 
 
 
Yelowitz, Aaron S., 2000. Using the Medicare buy-in program to estimate the effect of Medicaid 
on SSI participation. Economic Inquiry 38 (3), 419-441. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 Medicaid covered population ages 19 to 64 under MassHealth 
Before health reform After health reform 
Base population FPL Expanded populations  FPL 
Pregnant women ages 
19 and older 
considered 
presumptively eligible 
0-200% Pregnant women ages 19 and older 
considered presumptively eligible 
0-300% 
Parents or adult 
caretaker relative 
living with their 
children under age 19 
0-133% Parents and caretaker relatives  0-300% 
Disabled adults  0-133% Disabled adults  0-133% 
Parents and disabled 
nonworking adults  
0-133% Non-working disabled adults  Above 133% 
  Higher income adults with disabilities 
working 40 hours a month or more 
Above 133% 
Long term unemployed 
individuals 
0-100% Long-term unemployed individuals or 
members of a couple and a client of 
Department of Mental Health (DMH) and/or 
receiving Emergency Aid to the Elderly, 
Disabled and Children (EAEDC)** 
0-100% 
Long-term unemployed individuals or 
members of a couple, and neither a client of 
DMH or receiving EAEDC** 
0-100% 
Families receiving unemployment benefits** 0-400% 
Note: Presumptive eligibility is offered to certain children enrolled in MassHealth Standard and Family Assistance 
as well as pregnant women receiving services through the MassHealth Pre-Natal program. FPL=Federal Poverty 
Level. 
Source: MassHealth Medicaid Section 1115 Demonstration, 2008. **Not otherwise eligible for medical assistance 
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Before health Reform After health Reform 
Base population FPL Expanded populations  FPL 
Individuals living with 
HIV positive 
0-133% Individuals living with HIV positive** 0-300% 
Woman under age 65 
with breast or cervical 
cancer 
0-250% Women eligible under the Breast and 
Cervical Cancer Treatment Program 
(BCCTP) 
0-250% 
 Individuals ages 19 and older with no access 
to ESI, Medicare, or other subsidized health 
insurance programs, including the following 
groups: 
(1) Low-income adults; 
(2) Adults working for an employer with 50 
or fewer employees who offers no insurance 
or who contributes < 33% (or < 20% for 
family coverage) towards insurance costs 
 
(1) 0-300%; 
(2) 0-300% 
  Adults under the age of 65 who work for a 
qualified small employer and purchase ESI** 
0-300% 
  19 and 20 years olds 0-300% 
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Table 3.2 Summary of Medicaid recipients 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Treatment State 
Massachusetts 1,042,123 1,074,050 1,110,475 1,267,776 1,448,115 1,568,182 
Residents 6,455,028 6,452,636 6,453,694 6,466,399 6,499,275 6,543,595 
% 16.14% 16.65% 17.21% 19.6% 22.28% 23.97% 
Control States 
Connecticut 496,680 500,952 520,660 517,529 518,675 524,210 
Residents 3,468,319 3,474,379 3,477,185 3,484,531 3,488,084 3,502,664 
% 14.32% 14.42% 14.97% 14.85% 14.87% 14.97% 
Rhode Island 201,875 207,621 209,371 212,491 208,429 203,731 
Residents 1,072,453 1,075,835 1,069,226 1,064,193 1,059,706 1,058,368 
% 18.82% 19.30% 19.58% 19.97% 19.67% 19.25% 
New Hampshire 112,044 119,207 120,760 126,458 126,074 131,056 
Residents 1,282,146 1,292,566 1,301,050 1,311,184 1,316,496 1,320,981 
% 8.74% 9.22% 9.28% 9.64% 9.58% 9.92% 
Vermont 154,664 148,921 150,836 149,808 157,240 162,143 
Residents 616,700 618,120 618,797 619,916 620,438 620,967 
% 25.08% 24.09% 24.38% 24.17% 25.34% 26.11% 
New Jersey 949,741 959,843 965,768 1,004,370 1,019,936 1,065,155 
Residents 8,585,567 8,610,474 8,619,564 8,619,354 8,630,810 8,657,319 
% 11.06% 11.15% 11.20% 11.65% 11.82% 12.30% 
Pennsylvania 1,721,707 1,834,651 1,990,466 2,064,061 2,181,821 2,134,331 
Residents 12,360,988 12,387,357 12,415,908 12,466,485 12,517,701 12,562,536 
% 13.93% 14.81% 16.03% 16.56% 17.43% 16.99% 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division. 2011. Table 1. Preliminary Annual Estimates of the Resident 
Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2010 (NST-PEST2010-
01); Medicaid data are from Annual Statistical Supplement, 2003 to 2008, Medicaid: State Data; Massachusetts 
Medicaid Statistics, 2006 to 2008. The original sources are Medicaid Statistical Information System State Summary 
Data and Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 
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Table 3.3 Summary of initial claims of SSI ages 18 to 64 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Treatment State 
Massachusetts 39,645 35,032 35,169 35,630 34,935 35,461 
Residents  4,089,322 4,097,973 4,087,881 4,132,347 4,157,960 4,199,836 
% 0.97% 0.85% 0.86% 0.86% 0.84% 0.84% 
Control States 
Connecticut 14,535 14,106 14,278 15,187 15,258 15,745 
Residents 2,177,308 2,191,123 2,201,141 2,216,080 2,209,809 2,211,032 
% 0.67% 0.64% 0.65% 0.69% 0.69% 0.71% 
Rhode Island 4,285 4,251 4,921 6,126 5,992 6,552 
Residents 681,318 686,232 681,060 682,193 677,870 674,602 
% 0.63% 0.62% 0.72% 0.90% 0.88% 0.97% 
New Hampshire 4,602 4,330 4,516 4,754 4,812 5,568 
Residents 827,282 837,834 843,684 854,641 851,900 852,473 
% 0.56% 0.52% 0.54% 0.56% 0.56% 0.65% 
Vermont 3001 2765 2873 3073 3089 3125 
Residents 401529 405,738 408,449 407,553 405,476 405,691 
% 0.75% 0.68% 0.70% 0.75% 0.76% 0.77% 
New Jersey 33,129 31,579 29,204 31,849 33,114 34,171 
Residents 5,382,937 5,416,679 5,426,768 5,507,480 5,487,495 5,484,138 
% 0.62% 0.58% 0.54% 0.58% 0.60% 0.62% 
Pennsylvania 86,447 82,024 84,783 89,153 87,284 89,054 
Residents 7,632,997 7,672,780 7,720,030 7,750,425 7,756,413 7,775,704 
% 1.13% 1.07% 1.10% 1.15% 1.13% 1.15% 
Notes: Author’s calculations based on SSA and CB data. 
Source: Caseload data are from SSA State Agency Monthly Workload Data; Population ages 18 to 64 data are from 
Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 2003 to 2008; the original sources are 
Census Bureau, 2003 to 2008 resident population. 
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Table 3.4 DD estimates on initial claims rate of SSI, percentage of Medicaid recipients, and SSI-
disabled beneficiaries 
Before After DD 
(1) SSA  (2) CMS (3) CPS 
03-04 07-08 SSI Medicaid SSI-disabled 
6 control states n=28 n=28 n=85,308 
-0.00157*** (0.0005) 0.0562*** (0.0066) -0.0075*** (0.002) 
4 control states n=20 n=20 n=52,436 
-0.00188*** (0.0006) 0.06015*** (0.005) -0.007*** (0.003) 
2 control states n=12 n=12 n=42,573 
      -0.00094** (0.0004)   0.04832*** (0.009)   -0.0082*** (0.003) 
Notes: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 2. Author’s calculations are based on SSA, CB data and Annual 
Statistical Supplement, 2003 to 2008. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test. 
**   Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test. 
*     Significant at the 10 percent level, two-tail test. 
Source: (1) SSA State Agency Monthly Workload Data; (2) Annual Statistical Supplement, 2003 to 2008, Medicaid: 
State Data. The original sources are Medicaid Statistical Information System State Summary Data and Center for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services; (3) 2005 to 2009 March Current Population Survey19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Since the main matching variable, Household identification number (H_IDNUM) was renamed H_IDNUM1, and H_IDNUM2 
beginning at 2004, I only use 2004 as pre-reform period for data matching consistency.  
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Table 3.5 Number of TANF families meeting work requirements in recent years 
  TANF families 
Before Deficit Reduction Act  After Deficit Reduction Act  
FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 
USA 
Meet work requirements 295,294 269,679 263,092 243,026 
With work requirements 874,798 807,710 870,140 815,877 
% 33.80 33.4 30.2 29.8 
Treatment State 
Massachusetts 
Meet work requirements 6,624 3,818 4,110 14,326 
With work requirements 11,061 23,699 21,616 31,740 
% 59.9 16.1 19 45.1 
Control States 
Connecticut 
Meet work requirements 3,154 2,446 3,014 2,187 
With work requirements 9,262 7,913 10,443 8,667 
% 34.1 30.9 28.9 25.2 
Rhode Island 
Meet work requirements 1,589 1,438 1,289 845 
With work requirements 6,564 5,748 4,708 4,809 
% 24.2 25 27.4 17.6 
Note: TANF=Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Numbers are average monthly numbers for families 
receiving TANF cash assistance. The percentages were calculated by Author. 
Source: GAO-10-525 Report. The original source was from Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
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  TANF families 
Before Deficit Reduction Act  After Deficit Reduction Act  
FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 
Control States 
New Hampshire 
Meet work requirements 839 787 947 780 
With work requirements 3,407 3,269 2,292 1,662 
% 24.6 24.1 41.3 46.9 
Vermont 
Meet work requirements 683 631 628 419 
With work requirements 3,047 2,837 2,806 1,947 
% 22.4 22.2 22.4 21.5 
New Jersey 
Meet work requirements 7,460 7,150 6,766 3,702 
With work requirements 25,427 24,440 20,486 19,625 
% 29.3 29.3 33 18.9 
Pennsylvania 
Meet work requirements 10,003 17,258 13,286 8,897 
With work requirements 65,832 62,396 26,388 21,550 
% 15.2 27.4 50.3 41.3 
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Table 3.6 Summary of cancer patients ages 20 to 64 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Treatment State 
Massachusetts 16,186 16,476 16,736 17,522 17,741 17,913 
Residents 4,089,322 4,097,973 4,087,881 4,132,347 4,157,960 4,199,836 
% 0.40% 0.40% 0.41% 0.42% 0.43% 0.43% 
Control States 
Rhode Island 2,528 2,741 2,661 2,779 2,868 2,831 
Residents 681,318 686,232 681,060 682,193 677,870 674,602 
% 0.37% 0.40% 0.39% 0.41% 0.42% 0.42% 
New Hampshire 3,305 3,329 3,434 3,634 3,519 3,639 
Residents 827,282 837,834 843,684 854,641 851,900 852,473 
% 0.40% 0.40% 0.41% 0.43% 0.41% 0.43% 
New Jersey 20,689 20,966 21,214 22,361 22,832 22,438 
Residents 5,382,937 5,416,679 5,426,768 5,507,480 5,487,495 5,484,138 
% 0.38% 0.39% 0.39% 0.41% 0.42% 0.41% 
Pennsylvania 29,865 30,613 31,001 32,294 33,233 33,567 
Residents 7,632,997 7,672,780 7,720,030 7,750,425 7,756,413 7,775,704 
% 0.39% 0.40% 0.40% 0.42% 0.43% 0.43% 
Source: National Program of Cancer Registries: 1999 - 2008 Incidence, WONDER On-line Database. United States 
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and National Cancer 
Institute; 2011. Accessed at http://wonder.cdc.gov/cancernpcr-v2008.html on Aug 16, 2011 9:35:24 PM; Population 
ages 18 to 64 data are from Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program, 2003 to 
2008; the original sources are Census Bureau, 2003 to 2008 resident population. 
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Table 3.7 Medicaid expansion effect 
Before After SSI 
03-04 07-08 (1) DD (2) DDD 
Within 
Massachusetts n=8 n=40 
      -0.00098*** (0.0003)   -0.00174 (0.001) 
Notes: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 2. Author’s calculations are based on SSA and USCS data. 
*** Significant at the 0.1 percent level, two-tail test. 
Source: National Program of Cancer Registries: 1999 - 2008 Incidence, WONDER On-line Database. United States 
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and National Cancer 
Institute; 2011. Accessed at http://wonder.cdc.gov/cancernpcr-v2008.html on Aug 16, 2011 9:35:24 PM 
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Table 3.8 Placebo tests 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent Vars. SSI Medicaid 
Treatment State, (Six Control States)  
(1) Massachusetts, (CT,RI,NH,VT,NJ,PA) -0.00157*** 0.0562*** 
(0.0005) (0.0066) 
(2) Connecticut, (MA,RI,NH,VT,NJ,PA) -0.00023 -0.0158 
(0.0007) (0.014) 
(3) Rhode Island, (CT,MA,NH,VT,NJ,PA) 0.00278*** -0.0176 
(0.0004) (0.0139) 
(4) New Hampshire, (CT,RI,MA,VT,NJ,PA) 0.0000942 -0.0133 
(0.0007) (0.014) 
(5) Vermont, (CT,RI,NH,MA,NJ,PA) -0.000145 -0.009 
(0.0007) (0.0143) 
(6) New Jersey, (CT,RI,NH,VT,MA,PA) -0.00058 -0.0111 
(0.0007) (0.014) 
(7) Pennsylvania, (CT,RI,NH,VT,NJ,MA) -0.00035 0.01082 
(0.0007) (0.014) 
Observations 28 28 
Notes: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 2. Author’s calculations are based on SSA data and Annual Statistical 
Supplement from 2003 to 2008. 
*** Significant at the 0.1 percent level, two-tail test. 
**   Significant at the 1 percent level, two-tail test. 
*     Significant at the 5 percent level, two-tail test. 
MA=Massachusetts; CT= Connecticut; NH= New Hampshire; NJ= New Jersey; PA= Pennsylvania; RI= Rhode 
Island; VT= Vermont. 
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